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PREFACE

Tliis thesis will attempt to uncover the developing international:
structure in Southeast Asia for the next decade.

For purposes of this

writing, Southeast Asia will include Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore,
the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Vietnam.

Initially, a

brief survey of U.S. relations with Thailand will serve as a point of
orientation to the emergence of the Nixon Doctrine and disengagement.
Following this, the latest examples of Southeast Asian regionalism will
be examined and the new quandrilateral relationship of the great powers
in the area will be viewed.

The conclusions will present some specula-

tions as to desirable actions that great powers and nations of the area
might initiate to contribute to stability and insure that the simultaneous
emergence of regionalism and the quadrilateral relationship become
compatible.
My acknowledgements for assistance in writing are to the following
people:

to Dr. Forest L. Grieves, my thesis director, who helped me

initiate the project and provided needed assistance at many impasses;

to

Dr. Louis D. Hayes, who provided insight and encouragement;: to Dr. Frank B«
Bessac, who contributed his extensive knowledge of the many nations of the
subject area;

to Anita Lexd.s and Joy Schroeber, who typed the manuscript

so efficiently.

August, 1971
Missoula, Montana
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CHAPTER I
DEVELOPMENT OF THAI-U.S. RELATIONS

The Early Treaties
The first treaty ever negotiated between the United States and an
Asian nation was made in 1833 by the Thai King, Fhra Nong Khao (Rama III),
and Edmund Roberts, a diplomatic envoy sent to Southeast Asia by President
Andrew Jackson.'*’ This first treaty was signed at Bangkok on March 20,
1833 and was primarily a treaty of amity and commerce.

Its purposes

were to establish a "perpetual peace" between the United States and the
------- King of Siam, and to enable the citizens of-both countries to hold com---mercial intercourse in the ports of their respective nations,.
The Treaty of 1833 is significant not only because it was the first
treaty concluded by the U.S. with an Asian nation, but also because it
built friendship between the two countries as equals.

There was no sug

gestion of an encroachment on Thailand's sovereignty and this greatly im
pressed the Thai leaders.

Further, this treaty was concluded ten years

before the treaty which established relations between the U.S. and China
and twenty years before the one establishing relations betv/een the U.S.
and Japan.^
However, this somewhat tranquil relationship based on equality
did not last long.

Shortly thereafter, a system of extraterritoriality

■^U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background
Notes on Thailand. Pubn. No. 796l, June, 1967, p. 4o
^Royal Thai Embassy, Office of Public Relations Attache, Thailand
and Her Relations with the U.S., February, 1970, p. 1.
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was imposed on Japan by treaties concluded by Western nations for the
protection of Western merchants,,

Subsequently, a similar system made dis

appearance in Thailand, and Britain led other Western powers to impose
this system,upon the Thais in the form of a series of new treaties con
cluded in the years of

1855

and

1856,

The second treaty between the United States and Thailand was
signed at Bangkok on the 19th of May, 1856,

It was known as the Treaty

of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,^
signed on behalf of the United States.

Mr. Townsend Harris

According to the terms of this

treaty, a large slice of Thai sovereignty was carved away.

All American

citizens coming to Thailand were exempted from jurisdiction of the Thai
Courts of Law; and while Thailand could impose import duty on .all-articles
of import from the U.S., such duty was not to exceed three per.cent of the
market value of the goods0
There seems little doubt that by these treaties with the Western
powers of the period, Thailand was deprived of some of her rights as a
sovereign nation— the right to administer justice to all throughout her
kingdom and the right to levy such import tariffs as would meet her in
creasing need for the development of her country.

In her struggle to free

herself from these treaty obligations, the Thai leaders made frequent and
persistent efforts to have the old treaties revised; but these efforts
were to no avail.

During the latter 1800's American missionaries entered

Thailand in small numbers and initiated reforms in education, medicine,
and technology.

^Ibld,
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Further, about 1900, King Chulalongkom employed advisors from
the Harvard Law School to assist the kingdom in abolishing extra
territoriality,,

Toward the end of World War I, during which Thailand had

sent her troops to France to fight with allied soldiers, Thailand again
appealed for the revision of the previous treaties*

The allies convened

a council at Versailles for this purpose, but only the U.S. supported
revision.

Subsequently, in 1920, the U.S. kept her word and concluded

a new treaty without asking for any compensation.

This treaty was signed

in Washington, D.C. on the 16th of December, 1920.^
this treaty the agreement of

1856

Under the terms of

was nullified in its entirety.

In addition, the U.S. relinquished all

ectraterritorial rightsand

all American citizens were made subject to the jurisdiction of the
Thai Courts of Law.

Regarding the limitations of the tariff, Thailand

was given the right to impose any tariff on American goods providing the
other treaty powers also agreed without compensation.

Thus, the United

States was the first country to have voluntarily surrendered the extra
territorial rights of its citizens and the limitations upon tariffs.
The 1920 treaty was an important force that exerted influence upon other
treaty powers and led them to give up theirspecial rights.
By 1926, all the old treaties had beenrevised and thelimitations
upon Thai jurisdiction abolished.

The Thai leaders were aided in this

endeavor by the services of Francis B. Sayre, son-in-law of President
Woodrow Wilson and later American Commissioner in the Philippines.

Thus,

the good will and friendship between the two countries was solidified.

^U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background
Notes on Thailand. Pubn. No. 7961, June,1967, p. 4«
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Throughout this era, good will was created, many friendships were
formed and the Thai began looking to the U.S. for moral support in
their struggles with the British and French.

In addition, many Americans

voiced their admiration for the small country in Southeast Asia which had
remained independent of colonial rule0
A fourth treaty between the two countries was signed at Bangkok
on the 13th of November, 1937.

This treaty, which was based on the full

measure of equity, reciprocity and mutual benefit, is still in force today.

When World War II began in December of 1941, a lull was initiated

in Thai-U.S. relations.
came Thai resistance.

The Japanese invaded Thailand and quickly over
From this time until the end of the war, Thailand

was occupied by,Japanese forces and was cqnsidered as such by the United_
States.

Further, the Thai military leader, Phibun Songkhram, declared war

against the U.S. and Great Britain in order to gain maximum autonomy for
the Thai Government during the occupation period.
However, there was no actual deep-seated hostility toward the
Western nations nor any real sympathy for Imperial Japan.

Owing to this,

the United States took a somewhat unconventional action and refused to
recognize this declaration of war and supported a ’’Free Thai*' movement
that infiltrated the country for military and intelligence purposes.^
Thai nationals in both the United States and Great Britain organized this
movement as well as underground resistance which co-operated closely with

%oyal Thai Embassy, Office of Public Relations Attache, Thailand
and Her Relations with the U.S., February, 1970, p. 3.
^James G. Driscoll, "American Policy in Thailand," National
Observer (August 25, 1969), p. 16.
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the United States and other allies.

However, at the end of World War II,

Thai leaders had to make a formal agreement with Great Britain for the
termination of the "State of War" between the two countries®

In contrast,

the United States made a forthright declaration that it did not regard
itself at war with Thailand, and consequently, sphere was no need to
conclude any treaty or. agreement to terminate the State of War between
the two countries.

Further, no compensation or reparation was demanded

from the Thais0
Relations after World War II
After World War II, Thailand turned to the United States for sup
port and friendship and received a spontaneous response.

An agreement

concerning economic and technical co-operation was signed by the two
countries on the 19th of September, 1950, and since then economic and
technical assistance has flowed from the U.S. to the Kingdom.

When Com

munist power was established on the mainland of China in 1949, a danger
to Thailand in the form of threats of military aggression and clandestine
subversion became apparent.

Thus, on October 17, 1950, the United States

and Thailand concluded the Military Assistance Agreement.

According to

this agreement, U.S. military aid has been rendered to help strengthen
the Thai armed forces and Joint United States Military Assistance and
Advisory Group was established to train Thai officers and soldiers.
With the close of ’World War II and the commencement of the Cold War
in Southeast Asia, the United States replaced Great Britain as the
major foreign influence in Thailand; and the policy of containment of
Communist agression led the American Govei*nment to initiate a rapidly
expanding role in the relations between the two countries.
as the Cold War began, American interests were:

In brief,

6
1. Geographical— Thailand composes a strategic area in the center
of mainland Southeast Asia. After 1948, the surrounding
countries became embroiled in bitter military conflicts either
with their former colonial rulers or with Communist insurgencies.
To American policy-makers, Thailand appeared as an oasis of
stability in a region of turmoil. Any reluctance by the U.S.
to cooperate with an authoritarian military regime was overcome by
the need to protect Southeast Asia from falling under Communist
rule.?
2. Peoole— The Thai people, about thirty-two million, comprise the
largest population of any state on the mainland of Southeast
Asia. Approximately 85% are peasants, however, they are capable
of sophisticated tasks. Thus, they could be trained by their own
leaders for the defense and advancement of their country, or
they could be trained by a hostile power to carry out the
overthrow of their own Government. Further, unlike other nations
in the area, the Thai do not suffer from intense pluralism. Rather,
the nation is relatively well unified, and a large majority of
the people are loyal to the King. Though minorities exist,
they are a manageable and modest problem. The three million
Chinese who control much of the private sector are satisfied with
their economic status and play little role in international
------- affairs . 8 ------------------------- . — ---------------- :-----3. Resources— 'Thailand is the world’s leading rice exporterand
annually produces a surplus of in excess of one million tons.
Further, a light industrial base has been developed and more
manufactured goods are being produced
locally.
Over one
hundred American firms operate in the
area andThai resources are
. important to American policy because they assist in the economic
development of non-Communist countries in Asia. Thus, the control
of Thai resources by a hostile power could be used to the
disadvantage of the United States and the non-Communist nations
in Southeast Asia.9
American foreign policy toward Thailand since the beginning of the
Cold War can be divided into three phases.
period from about

1950

to

1961.

The first encompasses the

During this era, the primary objective

of the United States was to build the country into a ’’bastion" of the

?Frank C. Darling, "America and Thailand," Asian Survey. Vol. 7,
No. 4 (April, 1967), pp. 215-216.
%bid.
9lbid.. p. 217.
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Free World and to prepare the country for an onslaught from Communist
China.

Despite the fact that overt aggression was unlikely, the United

States rapidly expanded the Thai armed forces from 30,000 to 100,000 men.
Though the country had very few domestic Communists, the Americans strengthened
the Thai police forces and urged suppressive measures against opponents
of the Government.

A strong U.S. Army mission helped train the Thai

military and large quantities of American armament were provided.

In

addition, a modest chemical aid program begun in 1947 was converted to
military objectives.-*-®
The internal repercussions of this policy were largely ignored
by many American diplomats.

With the large-scale military assistance

from the United States, the Thai military leaders were able to expand

__

their control into every phase of national life and corruption within
the military leadership greatly surpassed that of former civilian regimes.
Further, the constitutional institutions inaugurated after the war were
completely abolished and political parties and organized pressure groups
were forbidden if not controlled by the ruling regime.H

Throughout this

phase, Thailand did make considerable economic progress; but much of the
new prosperity went to a few favored groups such as the high-ranking
military officers, land owners and privileged Chinese merchants.
Thousands of civil servants remained underpaid and millions of
peasants received only a fraction of the price obtained from the sale of
their rice.

Som advances were made in education; but again, progress

l®Frank C. Darling, "Thailand: De-e.scalation and Uncertainty,"
Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 2 (February, 1969), p. 116.
n Ibid.

_
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was limited and, in many cases, reserved for the elite.

Modem welfare

services were restricted primarily to Bangkok and a few provincial centers,
while secondary and primary schools outside the capital remained under
staffed.

To a certain degree, American policy during this first phase

intensified the "split personality" which characterized the Thais at
the end of the absolute monarchy.

In diplomacy, finance, and trade where

Americans and other foreigners dealt closely with the country, the Thais
consistently exhibited a high level of intelligence and sophistication.
Thus, the Kingdom's foreign policy realistically adjusted the national
interest to the main forces of international politics.

In addition, the

country was secure, the currency sound and foreign trade expanding.
However, in domestic affairs where Americans did_ not directly
participate, the Thai displayed immaturity and a low level of sophistica
tion.

Personal relationships continued to remain dominant in political

life and little opportunity existed for the formation of political parties.
The second phase of American policy in Thailand since World War II com
menced in approximately
to 1968.

196l

and encompasses the period from that year

During this period, the major function of Thailand for American

strategy in Southeast Asia was to serve as a base in the military struggle
to preserve the independence of South Vietnam.

American planes used air

fields in Thailand located only a few hundred miles from targets in North
Vietnam.

Further, numerous logistic and support facilities were con

structed and Bangkok served as a rest-and-relaxaticn center for U.S.
servicemen on leave from Vietnam.^

3-%red Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York:
McGraw-Hill Company, 1968), p. 118.
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The goals of U.S. policy during the first phase— to prepare
Thailand for external aggression— overlap to scone degree with the ob
jectives of the second phase.

However, strategy in this phase rested

on more realistic and rational grounds.

South Vietnam was under intense

Communist attack from both external and internal sources, and the U.S. and
other non-Communist nations in the area felt they had a vital interest in
preserving the independence and integrity of the former French colony.
Thailand has played a crucial role in this endeavor and without the use
of Thai bases, the U.S. military effort would be much more difficult and
costly.
During this phase American policy in the military fields showed
moderation.

The militant anti-communism of the past was tempered and

more emphasis was placed on economic and social development.

With Amer

ican assistance, the Thai Government gave more help to the provinces where
units of modern technology have traditionally been quite sparse.

Much of

this program was concentrated on the strategic provinces of the Northeast.
Improved roads now lead into formerly remote areas and for the first time
in history universities have been constructed outside the capital cits'- of
Bangkok.

Further, more elementary and secondary schools were built and

the country, generally, experienced increased prosperity.
However, the second phase is also characterized by the continual
lingering of former political problems.

Though the Government is more

moderate than its predecessors, for few factions within the military leader
ship are vying for power and attempts to move to some form of constitutional

^Darling, "America and Thailand," p. 219.
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government have been blocked by policies that emphasize order and
security.

In addition, the acute maldistribution of wealth continues to

breed crime, and civil servants have not received pay raises since 1951.^

Post 196B Developments
Thus, the third phase of U.S. policy toward the Kingdom emerges.
This phase is post-1968 and is characterized by de-escalation and
uncertainty.

Winston Churchill once remarked that,

"Sovereign nations

possess no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; they only possess
permanent interests."^

In 1968, certain aspects of this fundamental

principle of international politics became painfully apparent to many
members of the Thai Government.

The de-escalation of American military

power in the Vietnamese War and the possibility of a retrenchment of
U.S. policy outside Southeast Asia aroused a growing sense of doubt
and uncertainty among officials in the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
These develocments jolted them into a deeper realization that important
sectors of their national life are closely related to the vagaries of
international affairs.
Initial concern began when former President Johnson announced
on March 31, 1968 that he was reducing the level of American military
involvement in Vietnam and taking steps tovrard a negotiated peace set
tlement with the Hanoi government.

As the American presidential campaign

progressed, Thai Foreign Affairs officials became increasingly worried

^Darling, "America and Thailand," p. 219.
^Darling, "Thailand: De-escalation and Uncertainty," p. 115.
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over numerous demands— from critics of both major political parties— for
a disengagement of American power from Southeast Asia.

In addition, public

appeals for withdrawal from Vietnam and claims that the U.S. has only a
"limited obligation" in Thailand had a chilling effect on many members
of the Thai Government.
In brief, officials in Bangkok became increasingly fearful that
,the U.S. policy which had been followed for several decades might be
coming to an end.
Khoman declared,

At mid-year 1968, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat
"The United States has tried to raise some doubts in

our minds, and it has succeeded.
its own mind."^

It has succeeded in raising doubts in

This uncertainty heightened as external and internal

Communist threats continued to confront the Kingdom. On the.third an- ____ _
niversary of the Communist Underground Organization— the Thai Patriotic
Front— Peking appealed for renewed efforts against American "Imperialism."
Further, insurgencies within Thailand became more active in the Northeast
and extreme South,^
Thus, in an official visit to Washington, D.C., in May, 1968,
Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachom sought assurances from the Johnson
Administration that the United States would not abandon its obligations
to defend Thailand following a settlement of the Vietnam War.

Simultaneously,

with Kittikachorn's visit to the United States, the Minister of National
Development headed a 38-member trade mission to New York appealing for more
private American investment in the Thai economy.

Offering attractive

^ J . L. S. Girling, "Thailand's New .Course," Pacific Affairs,
Vol. 42, No. 3 (Fall, 1969), p. 347.
17lbid. , p. 348.
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trade and investment incentives, the Kingdom has promoted an expanded
economic program with the hope that American efforts for peace and
stability in the area will continue to stress economic development
(through both public and private channels) following the end of the
Vietnam conflict.
Toward the latter portion of 1968, this extreme uncertainty
appeared somewhat unjustified and U.S. policy makers seemed to maintain
a genuine interest in Thailand's security and prosperity.

A joint

communique issued on July 9 reiterated America’s determination to uphold
its treaty commitments in Thailand.

~~

It stated:

The President re-emphasized the determination of the
United States to stand by its treaty commitments to
Thailand and its other allies in Asia. . . . He noted
“the pledge that he had given at the time of-his visit---to Bangkok in 3.966 that the commitment of. the United
States was not of a particular party or administration,
but of the people of the United States, and that,
’America keeps its commitments.'19

However, in September, 1969, talks between the two countries re
garding the departure of U.S. forces from the Kingdom grew directly out
of Thai concern for the country's security after the end of the Vietnam
War.

Further, President Nixon’s announcement of the withdrawal of the

first 25,000 men from Vietnam, and the President's emphasis on a future
"low visibility" military posture in Southeast Asia disappointed Thai
leaders who had welcomed Nixon's election as the implementation of a
harder-line policy.

In addition, on August 21, 1969, Secretary of Defense

^Darling, "Thailand: De-escalation and uncertainty," p. 116.
1 9 Ibid.,

p. 117.
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Melvin Laird stated that the Nixon Administration did not feel bound by
the

1965

contingency plan and a further withdrawal of
/

v

Vietnam was not communicated (beforehand) to Bangkok,,

35,000

troops from

20

Last, in July, 1969, following a speech in Bangkok, President
Nixon met with Thai leaders regarding the levels of U.S. forces in
Thailand.

At that time there were approximately 48,000 personnel, mostly

U.S. Air Force, in Thailand.

Subsequently, following talks in New York,

President Nixon and Prime Minister Kittikachom announced on September 30,
1969, that the two governments had agreed that 6,000 U.S. military per
sonnel would be withdrawn from Thailand by July
carried out on schedule,,

21

1

, 1970.

This was

Further, it was announced that the two

governments would continue to evaluate the level of'U„S. forces in —
Thailand in light of developments in Vietnam.

Following further

consultations, it was announced on September S, 1970, that an additional
9,800 U.S. personnel would be withdrawn by July 1, 197lo

22

In addition to withdrawal announcements, other aspects of Thai-U.S.
relations have desplayed strains.

Government spokesmen in Bangkok

were incensed and the American Government embarrassed when a Senate
foreign relations subcommittee disclosed that under a secret agreement
signed in 1967, the U.S. had paid the Thai Government more than $200

^Girling, ’’Thailand’s New Course,” p. 348.

21
U.S., Department ,of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Kingdom of
Thailand, Pubn. No. 7961, November, 1970, p 0 7o
2 2 Ibid.
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million to send troops to Vietnam.2^

Reportedly, to encourage the Thais

to assign an elite 11,000 man division to Vietnam, the U.S. agreed to
increase its military assistance and to supply the Thais with a battery
of Hawk antiaircraft missiles.

Foreign Minister Khoman decried,

"The

politicians of dubious morality who misrepresented this accord for the
sharing of responsibilities as a decision by the United States to engage
mercenaries. ',2^
A second element of strain on relations also became evident in
1970.

The policy of disengagement has resulted in extreme bitterness

in certain Government circles.

Foreign Minister Khoman*s wrath was

again vented against "certain elements of American society who began to
use this country as their favorite practice target"25 in a speech to the
American Chamber of Commerce in July, 1970:
One may ask in bewilderment why those immature and
irresponsible elements in the U.S. have shown per
sistence in persecuting and molesting such a loyal
friend and partner as Thailand. . . .In time of
stress and strain the scum comes to the surface.
It was those unwholesome elements which poisoned
the hearts and minds and adulterated the sound and
solid traditions of a great people, . . .For having
cooperated wholeheartedly with the United States,
Thailand had had to endure and suffer at the hands
of those ugly Americans. . . . It seems inescapable
that relations between Thailand and the United
States will evolve toward a more selective basis.2°
Thus, in 1970 as the U.S. moved toward a "low profile" and eventual

2^Clark D. Neher, "Thailand: Toward Fundamental Change,"
Survey, Vol. 11, No. 2 (February, 1971)> p. 136.
^Ibid., p. 137.
2 5 Ibid.
2 6 Ibid.
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disengagement in Southeast Asia, Thailand began looking in new directions
for a counterweight to the perceived Communist threat#

Thai officials

began stressing the need for an Asian front to include the major nonCommunist nations of the region.2?

in addition, Prime Minister

Kittikachorn announced that all Thai troops in Vietnam would be withdrawn
by 1972.

Next, he agreed to meet with North Vietnamese officials to

discuss the’repatriation of some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees living in
Thailand.

Finally, in 1970, Thailand, for the first time, signed trade

agreements with Eastern European nations.2®
In essence, the Thai leadership has not been gleeful over President
Nison’s moves to shift much of the burden of defending Southeast Asia
to Asians.

However, at least some in the ruling elite have long favored

closer relations among the Southeast Asian nations.

Thailand may be

expected to strengthen ties with such countries as the Philippines,
Indonesia, and possibly, develop a closer relationship with Peking.

The

key to the Prime Minister’s attitude toward China is almost certainly the
realization that after 1963, the coincidence of interests between Thailand
and the United States is receding; and, thus, the Thais can no longer
rely on America's protecting presence.

Thailand will certainly continue

to utilize American military and economic assistance, but they are also
seeking an alternative to the former policy of dependence by attempting
to lessen the hostility of Communist powers and by initiating steps to
build a non-Communist counterweight through regional cooperation.

2 ?Neher,
2 ®Ibid.

"Thailand:

Toward Fundamental Change," p. 137.

Possibly,
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this could serve as a "power base" in the area, which American public
opinion and the American Government would consider worth supporting.

The Nixon Doctrine
This "low visibility" posture set forth by the United States appears
to contain an implicit command directed toward the Southeast Asian
nations.

It seems to be telling them that they must assume a greater

burden and obligation for their own defense.

The "low posture" policy

in Asia (also sometimes referred to as the "Nixon Doctrine") has been
enunciated on several occasions.

In a lengthy statement at Bangkok,

Thailand on July 28, 1969, the President stated:
First, we remain involved in Asia. We are a
______ ____ _...... ..Pacific Power.. We have learned that peace for us
is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia.
Second, a growing sense of Asian identity and con
crete action toward Asian cooperation are creating
a new and healthy pattern of international relationships
in the region. Our Asian friends, especially in
Japan, are in a position to shoulder larger respon
sibilities for the peaceful progress of the area.
Third, while we will maintain our interests in Asia
and them commitments that flow from them, the chances
taking place in that region enable us to chance the
character of our involvement. The responsibilities
once borne by the United States at such great cost
can now be shared. Our important interests and
those of our friends are still threatened by those
nations which would exploit change and which pro
claim hostility to the United States as one of the
fundamental tenets of their policies. We do not
^
assume that these nations will always remain hostile,
and will work toward improved relationships wherever
possible.
At the beginning of my trip through Asia last
summer, I described at Guam the principles that
underlie our cooperative approach to the defense of
our common interests. In my speech on November 3,
I summarized the key elements of this approach.
-The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
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— We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens
the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation
whose survival we consider vital to our security and
the security of the region as a whole0
— In cases involving other types of aggression we shall
furnish military and e:conomic assistance when requested
and as appropriate® But we shall look to the nation
directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility
of providing the manpower for its defense®
This approach requires our commitment to helping
our partners develop their own strength® In doing so,
we must strike a. careful balance® If we do too little to
help them— and erode their belief in our commitments—
they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own
self-defense or become disheartened about prospects of
development. Yet, if we do too much, and American forces
do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote
dependence rather than independence®
The partnership we seek involves not only defense®
Its ulitmate goal must be equally close cooperation over.
a much broader range of concern— economic as well as
political and military. For in that close cooperation
with our Asian friends lies our mutual commitment to peace
in Asia and the world. Cur goal must be particularly
close cooperation for economic development® Here, too,
our most effective contribution will be to support Asian
initiatives in as Asian framework®
While I was in South Asia, I stated our view of the
method and purpose of our economic assistance to Asia.
These words were spoken in Pakistan, but they express
our goals as well for India and all of Asia®
I wish to communicate my Government's conviction
that Asian hands must shape the Asian future. This is
true, for example, with respect to economic aid, for
it must be related to the total pattern of a nation’s
life® It must support the unique aspirations of each
people. Its purpose is to encourage self-reliance,
not dependence®
The fostering of self-reliance is the new purpose
and direction of American involvement in Asia0
— While we have established general guidelines on
American responses to Asian conflicts, in practice
the specific circumstances of each case require care
ful study® . . . If we limit our own involvement
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in the interest of encouraging local self-reliance,
and the threat turns out to have been more serious
than we had judged, we will only have created still
more dangerous choices. On the other hand, if we
become unwisely involved, we risk stifling the local
contribution which is the key to our long-run com
mitment to Asia0
— The sucess of our Asia policy depends not only on
the strength of our partnership with our Asian
friends, but also on our relations with mainland
China and the Soviet Union. We have no desire to
impose our own prescriptions for relationships in
Asia. We have described in the Nixon Doctrine our
conception of our relations with Asian nations.
We hope that other great powers will act in a similar
spirit and not seek hegemony0
— A sound relationship with Japan is crucial in our
common effort to secure peace, security and a rising
living standard in the Pacific area. We look for
ward to extending the cooperative relationship we
deepened in 1969. But we shall not ask Japan to assume
responsibilities inconsistent with the deeply felt
concerns of its people.
— In South Asia, our good relations with India and
Pakistan should not obscure the concrete dilemmas
we will face. How can we bring home to both, for
example, our serious concern over the waste of their
limited resources in an arms race, yet recognize
their legitimate interests in self-defense?
— Asian regionalism is at its beginning. We will
confront subtle decisions as we seek to help main
tain its momentum without supplanting Asian direc
tion of the effort.
All these issues will confront this administration
with varying intensity over the coming years. We are
planning now to meet challenges and anticipate crises.
Our purpose in 1969 has been to make sure none was ig
nored or underestimated. The task ahead— for Asians
and Americans— is to address all these issues within
the imagination, realism and boldness their solutions
demand if lasting peace is to come to Asia.29

Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The United
States Role in Asia. Pubn. No. P-444, February, 1970, pp. l-4o
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Subsequently, on February 18, 1970, in his report to Congress on
Foreign Affairs the President stated:
What we seek for Asia is a community of free nations
able to go their ovm way and seek their own destiny
with whatever cooperation we can provide— a community
of independent Asian countries, each maintaining its
own traditions and yet each developing through mutual
cooperation,, In such an arrangement, we stand ready
to play a responsible role in accordance with our
commitments and basic interests.30
Thus, in these statements we can visualize at least some of the
factors which the President was attempting to enunciate,,

First, and

foremost, the United States will no longer assume the primary defense
role for countries of the area when confronted by insurgency-type con
flicts but will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the
manpower burden for its defense,.

This has been quite evident in Vietnam

where troop withdrawals have averaged

12,000

men a month since

1969,

and

31
troop strength is supposed to be down to 184,000 by December, 1971o
It was approximately 550,000 in 1968.3^
somewhat symbolizes this factor0

The "Vietnamization11 program

Second, the Doctrine maintains that

all treaty commitments will be kept and that a nuclear shield will be
provided if certain nations in the area are threatened by a nuclear power0
Third, the Doctrine implies increased cooperation in the economic sphere
as well as defense*

But again, the President emphasized that the most

30
■ U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The United
States Role in Asia. Pubn. No. P-444, February, 1970, pp. 1-4.
3^HNixon on Vietnam: More of the Same, 11 Newsweek. Vol. 77, No. 16
(April 19, 1971), p. 26.
3 2 Ibid.
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important contribution will be for the United States to support Asian
initiatives in an Asian framework*

Last, the President spoke of Asian

regionalism and sustaining its momentum*

Ultimately the Doctrine appears

to be telling the Asian nations that they must assume the primary role in
the battle for security, economic growth and defense*
Perhaps a more concise picture can be gained of this "low posture"
33
from the President’s article^written in Foreign Affairs*

Referring to

the future of Asia, Nixon states that it will be "one in which U.S. leader
ship is exercised with restraint, with respect for our partners and with
a sophisticated discretion that ensures a geuninely Asian idiom and Asian
origin for whatever new Asian institutions are developed*"34
'"•stated:

!

-

------ ■--- ------- --—

He further

— ---------------------- ■
--------

In a design for Asia’s future, there is no room for heavyhanded American pressures; there is need for subtle encour
agement of the kind of Asian initiatives that help bring
the design to reality* The distinction may seem superficial,
but in fact it is central both to the kind of Asia we want
and to the effectiveness of the means of achieving it*
The central pattern of the future in U.S.-Asian relations
must be American support for Asian initiatives*35
In essence, a shifting of the burden is what seems to be transpiring,
and further, a declining direct American presence*

This has been

evidenced not only in Thailand and Vietnam but also in South Korea
(20,000), Okinawa (5,000), and Japan (12,000)*

Further, Okinawa will

revert to the Japanese in 1972, and troops have been removed from Taiwan*

^Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 46,
No. 1 (October, 1967), p« 124*
%bid*
3 5 Ibid.

36
U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970’s. Vol. 64, No. 1656, March 22, 1971, p. 347*

36
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Obviously, it should not be assumed that the United States is
withdrawing completely.

Actually, some will argue that the U0S. is

seimply implementing a modified presence and will no longer play the
"Marshall Dillon" role.

This viewpoint contains some credence as

several years ago money was proposed for modernization of the U.S. Navy
when Vietnam subsides.

Supposedly, one of the functions of this modernized

Navy will be to maintain a quick-reacting type task force throughout
Asian waters as well as in other parts of the world.

Thus, one might

argue that Marshall Dillon will now "walk on water" rather than insert
ing his feet in a swampy jungle quagmire.

Secretary of Defense Melvin

Laird was more explicit (than previously) on April 13, 1971, regarding
~the future American military presence in Southeast Asia.

He states that, .

"The United States will keep air and naval power in Southeast Asia, under
the long-range Nixon Doctrine, after American ground troops are withdravn."

37 He continued, "To state that we would not have a presence in

Asia tinder this realistic deterrent strategy . • « would be very mislead
ing."38
Thus, it is obvious that an indirect presence is likely in the
military sphere.

In addition, in the economic sphere the U0S. will con

tinue to supply economic aid, but it will be in support of Asian initiatives
and will not smell of hegemony.

In brief, Southeast Asians must assume

the main responsibility for their economic growth and defense security,
and U.S. policy appears to be pointing toward this objective.

Thailand

"U.S. to Continue Presence in Asia," The Missoulian, April 14,
1971, P. 1.
3%bid.
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has, for several decades, assumed special significance for the United
States for several reasons.

First, diplomatic relations have existed

between the two countries for a longer period of time than between the
U.S. and any other Asian nation.

Second, Thailand is a stable and fairly

self-subsistent nation in an area where these factors are somewhat rare0
Third, the kingdom has never been colonized and has a fairly high degree
of unity.

Fourth, Thailand occupies a somewhat strategic geographical

location on mainland Southeast Asia and has been exhibiting economic
growth at a respectable rate.

The U.S. commitment to Thailand was

epitomized by Dean Rusk in 1962 when he made a statement concerning
SEATO.

He stated, "In the event of Communist armed attack against

Thailand, the SEATO obligation of the United States to act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes is
individual as well as collective."^

To some people in both countries

this meant that the U.S. would '’stand alone" to defend Thailand.
However, there seems little doubt that the Thai's special and
somewhat privileged position is coming to an end.

Further, if the over

powering American presence is receding in Thailand, then it seems evident
that all of the Southeast Asian leaders can look forward to a somewhat
congruent policy toward their nations.

Obviously, the "low posture" and

declining presence have been apparent in Vietnam, Japan, South Korea,
and other nations.

Thus, one begins to speculate on what may fill this

power vacuum evolving from the declining American presence.

It appears

that two forces are evolving to shape the Asian future of the late 1970's

■^u.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Kingdom
of Thailand, Pubn. No. 7961, November, 1970.
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and 1980'So

These two forces are regionalism and quadrilateralism0

Though Southeast Asias Regional Groupings have had little potential
in the past, there appears to be reason for at least cautious optimism
for them in the future0
chapter.

This force will be discussed in the following

The second emerging force— that of quadrilateralism will be

viewed in Chapter III0

/

CHAPTER II

REGIONALISM

Feasibility of Regionalism
Regional economic and security arrangements appear to be appropriate
for Southeast Asia for several reasons.

First, the major security

arrangements in the region during the next decades -will most likely be
for counterinsurgency-type forces and the likeliest areas to be threatened
are in Southeast Asia.

Second, in the aftermath of the Vietnam quagmire,

the United States is seeking to reduce the need for commitment of its own
combat forces in the area.

Third, Southeast Asian perceptions of the

need to meet insurgent threats have been heightened by Britain’s with
drawal from Singapore and the Thai insurgency.

Fourth, the formation of

ASEAN in 1967-— Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and
Singapore'®'— brought together the most important countries of Southeast
Asia into a group dedicated to regional cooperation.

The fact that five

nations formed this group seems to reflect a convition that development
goals of Southeast Asian states make it necessary for them to pool their
resources.

This convergence may suggest that if outside powers provide

relevant assistance, the next decades may witness the development of
successftil economic and defense cooperation in and among the countries
of Southeast Asia.

In the regard, Richard Butwell states: "If there is

^Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)— A multipurpose,
indigenous and politically neutral organization.
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a regional body in being that could evolve into a successor to SSATO
as a regional peace-keeping instrument, it is probably ASEAN.
Further, in his celebrated article in Foreign Affairs, Richard
Nixon discusses the transformation of Asia and states:
transformation is Asian regionalism,

"One key to this

Since 1965* it has become evident

that the United States has again begun to encourage multilateralism in
Southeast Asia,

This recent multilateralism looks beyond military al

liances toward groupings of Asian states based on wider and more enduring
convergencies of interest.

This shift was first noted in April of 1965

when former President Johnson, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University,
announced a $1 billion program to encourage regional development in
..Southeast Asia<A _________

__________________ .

_____ _

Encouragement of regionalism has been initiated by the United
States for two reasons.

First, the expectation exists that regional

cooperation, especially among the smaller countries, can aid in speeding
the processes of economic development.

For example, the U.S. is pressing

for the establishment of a common market in Latin America.

However,

few would argue that a common market approach is appropriate for Asia
at present.

Thus, the United States is encouraging other forms of

ilichard Butwell, "The Philipoines Under Marcos," Current History.
Vol. 58, No. 344 (April, 1970), p. 201.
^Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
No. 1 (October, 1967), p. 111.
4
Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Company, 1969), p . 104.

46,
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economic regionalism.
Development Bank.

A prime example is the establishment of the Asian

In addition, a variety of other cooperative ventures

are being encouraged.

Among these is a series of Southeast Asian

Ministerial Conferences on higher education and transportation.
These are essentially economic aspects of regionalism.

The

other aspect, which has become increasingly apparent, is based more
clearly on political considerations.

This part of American interest

stems from the belief that if regional cohesion develops in Asia, es
pecially if it includes Japan, it will help establish an added power
center.

Resultingly, in the short run with the added development and

stability that regional cooperation may bring, Asian states will be
less susceptible to subversion and be better able to defend themselves.
In the long run, the U.S. hope appears to be that Asian regionalism
will lead to a multibloc system in the area in the 1970s and SOs.

This

would be somewhat similar to a balance-of-power system and what the
United States seeks in the area seems to be a structure which is multi
centered and not tightly bi-polar.

Finally, this multi-polared structure

would (allegedly) lessen the probability of war.
This restructuring of the Asian system appears to be no accident,
or mere by-product of American actions.

Instead it appears to have

been a conscious goal of most U.S. officials including the President
himself.

To say that the U.S. hopes to help reshape the Asian system—

by virtue of a more cohesive Southeast Asia— is really saying that
American objectives are changing.

No doubt, the U.S. interest in the

area will remain the same— to prevent any one nation dominance in the
region— but there is no desire to press that interest to the point of
conflict *nith China.

The desire to avoid such a collision with China
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explains the American concern today to develop conditions that can
lead to a multipolar Asia.^

On October 17, 1966, at the East-West

Center in Honolulu, former President Johnson stated:

"No single nation

can or should be permitted to dominate the Pacific region."^
alluded to regional cooperation ■when he stated:

He also

"One after another,

the nations of Asia are casting off the spent slogans of earlier narrow
nationalism. . . . One after another, they are grasping the realities
of an interdependent Asia."?

The President cited the Asian Development

Bank, Asian and Pacific Council and other undertakings as evidence of the
new cooperation.

Further, in a speech at Middlebury College on June 12, 1967,
Walt W. Rostow, Johnson's assistant for national security affairs,
stated:

"We are finding in regionalism, a new relationship to the

world community somewhere between the overwhelming responsibility we
assumed in the early post-war years— as we moved in to fill vacuums
of power . . . and a return to nationalism."®

In brief, the degree

of political significance for the U.S. lies in the ability of South
east Asian regionalism to make a constructive contribution toward a
multipolar Asia.

A Southeast Asia that remains divided will not only

fail to contribute to multipolarity, it will continue to perpetuate
the tight bipolarity which is considered dangerous.

Thus, to the

^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia, p. 67.

^Seville R. Davis, "Containment in Asia," Christian Science
Monitor, October 19, 1966, p. 14.
7Ibid.
^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia, p. 69.
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extent that Southeast Asian states are weak and aim to embark in diverse
and separate directions in search of security and development, two
outcomes might appear and tend to maintain the present bipolarity.
One outcome might represent the successful achievement of Communist
China's goals as Fred Greene has concluded that China's desire is
"for predominance in the eastern half of Asia."9

If this objective were

achieved the likely result might lead the U.S. into policies even more
hostile and suspicious of China than is the case at present.

In addition,

it is possible that this may be the impact upon Japan as well, and
certainly the effect would not be a loosening of the present bipolarity.
The second outcome of a continued weakness and division in Southeast
—

Asia might represent, the opposite.pole: _ the continued need by Southeast__
Asia to rely on the United States.
This result would be somewhat of a continuance of the present
situation in Asia; for example, the Thai and Philippine Alliances with
the U.S. and the tendency of Indonesia to look to Washington for as
sistance.

This outcome can only be expected to heighten Chinese sus

picions and aggravate many tendencies that could lead her to initiate
aggressive behavior in Asia.

In essence, it seems apparent that region

alism is a vehicle which the U.S. intends to utilize to serve her
national interest in Asia.

This national interest— to prevent a direct

confrontation with China— will thus, be supported by an Asian
structure characterized by a loosening of bipolarity and the subsequent
emergence of multipolarity.

The U.S. has chosen to de-escalate the

confrontation with China, and further, is modifying its approach to

^Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Securit.y of Asia, p. 195*
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prevent one nation from dominating.

Though U.S. actions have spurred

Asian regionalism there are a number of reasons why there has been a
renewal of interest in regionalism within the

area.l®

No longer are

Asian leaders simply paying !,lip service" to U.S. proposals but are

.

taking positive action, for several reasons.
First, there is incentive emanating from China.

For the past few

decades scholars have debated and feuded in some cases regarding the
precise goals of China in Asia.

This writer is of the opinion that

China’s intentions are fairly clear.

China intends to achieve great-

power status, and in the tradition of great powers, she expects to be
regarded as dominant in the region of the world in which she lives.
Several analysts concur in this opinion.H
In the immediate future it appears for geographical reasons that
any Chinese expansion must be in the direction of Southeast Asia.
Soviet Union is a powerful presence to China’s North and West*

The

Similarly,

on her eastern flank a dynamic and somewhat prosperous Japan makes it
pointless to attempt major influence at present.

In contrast, Southeast

Asia represents a power vacuum and in contrast to other areas, is much
more ideal for the application of Mao’s revolutionary doctrines.

Further,

as a region still characterized by a poverty-ridden population, Southeast

■^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia, p. 75.
^ A . Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia(New York; Random
House, Inc., I960), p. 65; Richard G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign
Policy(New York: Frederick Praeger Company, 1962), p. 37; Fred Greene,
U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, p. 195; Harold Hinton, Communist
China in World Politics! Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p.' '394•
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Asia holds the promise of greater gains with less risk and effort than is
involved in other areas adjacent to China.

Finally, it is.in Southeast

Asia where the power'and policies of the United States— China's
proclaimed major enemy— are seen as provocative and need to be countered
and neutralized.
Yet some authors— David Mozingol^ and others— still argue that
Mao's foreign policies are simply defensive-response reactions to U.S.
actions and that China will live at peace with any Southeast Asian state
which is disassociated from the United States.

This writer feels that

this interpretation is not only optimistic but naive for several reasons.
First, in 196? Peking repeatedly called for the overthrow of the
"Rahman puppet clique" in Malaysia, a government that was not tied
to the U.S.^

Further, in 1965, there was Chinese involvement in an

attempt to stage a coup in Indonesia— a country which had intimately
close ties with Peking at the tirne.^

Even in Cambodia in 1968, Prince

Sihanouk suspected Chinese support for groups opposed to him.^

This

came despite the fact that earlier he had referred to China as Cambodia's
best friend.

In a formal statement he also added that "insurgents in

Laos and Thailand act on the orders of North Vietnamaid China.

•^David Kozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," World Politics,
Vol. 19, Mo. 3 (April, 1967), pp. 361-377.
•^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p.

76.

V. van der Kroef, "Gestapu in Indonesia," Orbis, Vol. 10,
No. 2 (Summer, 1966), p. 467.
■^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 77.
l6Ibid.
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Burma provides another interesting example*

After mid-year 1967/

Rangoon found that General We Win was branded a traitor by Peking*.
Subsequently, Peking has frequently called for, '’all the Burmese people to
rise up to strive for the complete overthrow of the Ne Win military
government and the establishment of a People's Democratic and United Front
17
Government." f In late 1968, there were reports of a mysterious new
Chinese assisted "Northeast Command,"

18

and it seemed that China was

laying the base for some type of united fronto

Thus, this ste m posture

toward Burma is somewhat unexplainable, especially since Ne Win had
gone out of his way to placate Peking.

If Peking is simply reacting

to the U.S. then she is "reacting" to threats that few others find
perceivable.

These brief examples illustrate that Peking may hot necessarily

seek friendly relations with neutral nations of Southeast Asia*,
A much more plausible explanation is that Peking seeks friendly
relations with governments in Asia who are subject to major Chinese
influence.

All in all, those idio continue to maintain that China is

simply reacting to U.S. presence are, in my opinion, simply failing
to recognize the realities of the situation and are engaging in super
ficial analysis.

Rather, is seems that China is behaving more in line

with the traditional behavior patterns of great powers.

Further, those

who deny the need for countervailing power around China reflect an
extremely naive view of the way Chinese power is likely to be usedo
Australian scholar has stated:

17
Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 77*

18

"Burma: The Insurgency, "Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol0 44
(October 17, 1968), p. 10.

An
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To argue in 1966 that China could never be expected
to acquiesce in a rival power structure in Southeast
Asia is precisely equivalent to arguing in 1946-47
that Russia could never be expected to tolerate a
rival power structure in Western Europe, Such a
situation was possible and Russia did in fact come
to accept it, and twenty years later after the process
began . o « the prospects for peace look a good deal
better than when it was initiated. To assume that
China must be conceded unchecked hegemony in South
Asia is to acquiensce in so substantial an addition
to her future power-base (taking into account man
power, resources and nuclear weapons) that it is
difficult to see the consequent world finding a way
to live quietly or to keep its crises manageable0
There is of course no present similarity between the
situation of South Asia and that of Western Europe,
That is why the intervention of the outside powers
over a long transition period /perhaps twenty years)
is likely to remain necessary.
In broad terms this is a view held by leaders in Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam,

Even Prince Sihanouk

stated in 1967 that, ”China does not swallow Cambodia because of the
20
Americans,”

In essence, this is the primary reason for a revived

interest in regionalism in the Southeast Asian nations; fear of Chinese
domination,

Fran the Asian standpoint, China is the traditional great

power of the region, with a long history of exercising considerable
influence.

Considering the fact that China is composed of one of the

great and cohesive world cultures, it is not surprising that her presence
has long impressed the people of Southeast Asia,

However, though several

Asian nations have been deeply influenced and shaped by Chinese culture
(Japan and Vietnam, for example) China has not become endeared to the

19

Coral Bell, "Towards a Stable Asia,” The World Today, Vol. 22,
(April, 1966), p. 190.
20nThe Sihanouk Trail,” Christian Science Monitor, October 16,
1967, p. 13.
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people on her borders.

She is still the giant of the region and looked

upon with a good amount of suspicion.
A second factor which has caused Asian leaders to turn to re
gionalism concerns the anxieties -which the small states feel toward the
nanyang or ’’overseas" Chinese.

Throughout the area the Chinese exercise

economic dominance that is in some cases resented, feared and distrusted,.
The movement of the Chinese to Southeast Asia is relatively recent; it
was accelerated greatly by the economic and administrative policies of
colonial regimes of the past centuries.

Despite their somewhat recent

arrival, the Chinese have been the dominant ethnic group in economic
matters in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and in some respects in Indonesia
■-and the •Philippines..^- —

- ----- :
--------------- ---- -- ------- ----

It is quite true that in some countries the Chinese have been
smoothly assimulated and in some have not occupied the role as in other
regimes, but this qualification does not detract from the fact that a
basic racism exists and is aimed at local Chinese,,

This is one of South

east Asia’s distinguishing characteristics and in the years since
independence, there have been many instances of abuse and intimidation,.
In brief, tvro China's exist in the minds of many Southeast Asians: China
the great and fearsome nation, and China the source of the dominated alien
group at home0 Neither is a positive factor.

It is in this perspective

that the concept of regional cooperation has been revived,,
China's unfriendliness has provided the factor which the en
vironment for regional cooperation has lacked: a common perception of
threat.

Since this was lacking, the concept of regionalism had no great

21Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, pp. 8l-820
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urgency.

However, there seems little doubt that China cannot be regarded

as a passive element in Asia's affairs and could become a troublesome
participant if nations of the area lack unity.

The third factor which

has caused nations of the area to turn to regionalism is a more positive
one and concerns economic potential.

It should be mentioned that, at

present, few Southeast Asian leaders think of regional cooperation as
a major input to defense needs.

Most recognize that defense requirements

cannot be met with local resources and that an American presence must
provide an indispensable security framework.
Rather, leaders in the area seem to see in regional cooperation
a means of achieving some type of solidarity and unity.

Thai Foreign

.Minister Thanat Khoman is an exception to this and has viewed regional
cooperation as more oriented toward political and security affairs.
1968, he states:

In

"The motivations are not only economic; the motivations

p p

are political."^

For many leaders, however, it has been more comfortable

to speak only in economic terms and this has been the primary publicly
expressed justification to date.
Some Asian economists stress that many of the developmental
needs of Southeast Asia— technical know-how, improved agricultural
productivity, and capital availability— can be met through greater
intra-Asian cooperation.

One of these, Professor Hiroshi Kitamura of the

United Nations has long Urged that Southeast Asian countries can reap
considerable benefits through regional harmony in their industrial develop
ment

programs.^

p p

Initially, some areas of industrialization (steel, aluminum)

,

^"Thailand: Economic Expansion," Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 44 (October 17, 1968), p. 156.
23

Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimension of Conflict in Southeast Asia
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 141-166.
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require considerable capital and one of the smaller states acting alone,
may not be able to manage the outlay.

In addition, world money markets

are likely to be attracted to opportunities which reflect a regional
plan.

The Governor of the Bank of Thailand has also expressed the

opinion that money markets are more likely to be attracted if two or
more countries do not duplicate facilities.2^*Asian specialists have maintained their pro arguments for several
years and in 1965 and 1966, the United States and Japan began to recon
sider their negative assessments.

The Japanese reversed their position

in 1965 and the United States followed in 1966 with each committing
$200 million to the Asian Development Bank.25

Thus, a final factor

which has hastened interest in,Asian.regionalism is that leading outsiders are in support of the concept.

Thus, if there are any positive

aspects of the Vietnam War, one might be that it has given the countries
of the area the time to begin restructuring their regional politics.
early as 1966, Thanat Khoman stated that,

As

11The long-range hope is to

build an effective Pacific community— to forge one that will be a
successful deterrent to aggression."^0
An Australian writer has stated:

"The U.S. stand in Vietnam has

both stimulated interest in and opened up the prospect of much closer
relationships between the free Asian states.

Instead of fretting about

how to live with communism, the Southeast Asians have now become concerned

^"Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 85.
25ibid., p. 87.
^"Thai Leaders in New York," Washington Post, October 30, 1966,
p. 29.

about finding a way to live with each other, conscious as never before
that by hanging together they will avoid the danger of being hanged
separately."^

In essence, there are three primary reasons why there

has been a renewed and more constructive interest in regionalism in
Southeast Asia.

First, there is a fear of China, the monolith of the

North and of the alien locals ’who have wielded considerable economic
power in the countries of Southeast Asia.

Second, there is at least a

chance of economic gain through more economic cooperation and interde
pendence.

Finally, with the blessings and support of the U.S. and Japan

the countries are much more confident when taking steps in this direction,,

Earlier Attempts at Regionalism
To date there have been several attempts at regional cooperation;”
and before discussing ASEAN in detail, it seems appropriate to discuss
earlier attempts that culminated in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations).

The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) had its origins in the

year of 1959 when the Prime Minister of Malaysia and President Garcia of
the Philippines conferred in Manilla.

Soon thereafter the Malaysian

leader Abdul Rahman began to circulate proposals for a Southeast Asia
Regional Organization.

This proposal came to the attention of Thai

Foreign Minister Khoman and in 1961 it was agreed that Malaysia, Thailand
and the Philippines would proceed with the establishment of ASA.

It was

formally created in a meeting at Bangkok, Thailand, in July of 1961.
The initial goals of the organization were somewhat idealistic. They

^Denis Warner, "First Steps Toward an Asian Common Market," The
Reporter, Vol. 35, (May 18, 1967), p. 24.
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included talk of a free trade area, a three-nation airline and a shipping
service and even a'common market.

Secondary goals included educational

exchanges, joint training.of agriculture technicians and joint programs
of industrial development.28
It "was soon evident that most interest centered on projects in the
economic field.

In early 1963, a number of meetings had taken place and

broad outlines were discernible.
separate levels..

The structure had developed on three

The first, and the one which had given ASA its birth, was

an annual foreign minister’s meeting.

The second level was comprised of

a group known as the Joint Working Party.

This body represented senior

officials in various ministries of the three governments and generally
.made recommendations regarding final,agreements of ASA.

The .third level

was the working committees who conducted detailed discussions and examin
ations of proposed cooperative

p r o j e c t s . ^9

Examples of these committees

included those concerned with shipping, trade liberalization, fisheries,
and agriculture.
In mid- 1963, as this structure was evolving, the organization
ceased operation due to conflicting claims to Borneo between Malaysia
.tr

and the Philippines.

Unfortunately, the organisation had just completed

its first year and v/as just beginning to outline some creative steps.
One of these was the "ASA Fund.”^

This fund v/as an initial three million

dollar subscription from each government and was to be used for financing

* 'Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, Chs. V, VI.
29Ibid.
-^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 101.

of joint reses-rch projects.

This was a somewhat unprecedented develop

ment and suggested that the three governments were beginning to look upon
the small subregional group with genuine, though limited, expectations of
accomplishment.

In a sense ASA operations went to the deep freeze from

1963 to 1966 but re-emerged in 1966.
This recovery was the first indication that regional cooperation
in Southeast Asia had a certain amount of dynamism.

In retrospect, though

ASA achieved few tangible results, it might be looked upon as a success
for several reasons.

First, it represented an unprecedented and indigenous

Asian effort and second, it set the programs and procedures for future
steps.

In addition, it increased communications and understanding among

its members and further, its most practical contribution was probably the
mere fact that it survived.

Owing to this a strong appeal to Southeast

Asia's elites was begun and eventually led to Indonesia's participation
in ASEAN in 1967.

Thus, with the birth of ASEAN in 1967 the two major

drawbacks of ASA— too small a membership, and a too Western-oriented group—
were removed.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is actually
the result of a merger between ASA and Maphilindo.^l

Maphilindo was

created in 1963 and though a loose consultive oriented body of the three
Malay nations (Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia) it was given
considerable attention for two reasons.

First, Indonesia was a participatin

nation and previously had avoided regional cooperation proposals.
Second, it was realized that Indonesia was a fairly productive nation in
Southeast Asia and that her participation in regional cooperation was

31
^Gordon, Toward Pisengagement in Asia, p. 111.
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highly desirable.
Initially, Indonesia's distaste for entering into the ASEAN scheme
was explained by distaste for aligning thamselves with a western leaning
organization and further since they consider themselves the natural leader
of the region they did not want to humble themselves by asking for membership.
Thus, in August of 1966, Thai Foreign Minister Khoman visited Djakarta and
discussed regional cooperation with Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam
Malik.Subsequently, in December a document was circulated from 3angkok
to the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore.and Malaysia which was a careful
and conscious merging of the purposes of ASA with much of the style of
Maphilindo.
This was the SEARC-proposal ( Southeast Asian Association for Re
gional Cooperation). Ultimately, through the efforts of Khoman and Adam
Malik differences concerning refinement of this proposal were resolved.
During this formation period, Thai and Indonesian leaders both gave a
remarkable amount of time to the task of creating the multination
organization.

Malik, during April and May of 1967, made a series of trips

throughout Southeast Asia with two purposes in mind.

The first was to

inform the neutral states of Burma and Cambodia of Indonesia's plans for a
new regional group and second, to negotiate with other leaders regarding
the launching of the new group,^3

3 2 " T h a i - I n d o n e s i a

confer," New York Times, August 30, 1966, p. 5*

^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 118.
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Meanwhile Khoman attempted to persuade Malaysian leaders to accept
Indonesia’s new course,

When finally successful, Khoman's reputation as

a negotiator was greatly enhanced and represented somewhat of a triumph
for him as he had long recognized that bipolarity is not only dangerous
but especially -uncomfortable for the smaller states of Asia,34
was formed at Bangkok on August 8, 1967.

Thus, ASEAN

Subsequently, writing in Foreign

Affairs, Adam Malik gave the organization strong endorsement and emphasized
its neutral nature,35
The significance of ASEAN is that it is the first general, indigenous
and politically neutral effort in Southeast Asian regional cooperation.
Its characteristic as a general or multipurpose organization means that
ASEAN must be distinguished from groups devoted to specific functions
such as.Mekong Development Committee and Southeast Asian Ministerial
Conferences on Education (SEAMES).

Most of these are narrowly based. The

indigenous nature of ASEAN should also be stressed as this is a most
important characteristic and was lacking in other efforts at regional
cooperation.

The ministerial conferences on education, SEATO and the

Colombo Plan have been based primarily on suoport and initiative of states
outside Asia.

ASEAN reflects high priority local interests stemming from

the consideration that the organization is entirely the work of Southeast
Asian governments.

34Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 119.

35A.dam Malik, "Promise in Indonesia," Foreign Affairs, Volc 46,
No. 2 (January, 1968), p. 302.
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Finally, much of the potential significance of A3SAN derives from
Indonesia*s participation, which helps remove the stigma of a Western
orientation,

ASEAN participation represents somewhat of a departure in

the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy and opens the possibility for
Indonesian collaboration with states that have had successful development
experience— Thailand and Malaysia,

Within a few months after the

Declaration, the five Governments agreed to designate Indonesia as the
host of the organization's standing committee.

36

Soon after representa

tives began meeting in Djakarta and in February of 1968, they had identi
fied a series of projects which were to be initiated.

For example,

efforts will concentrate on food production and supply, in which ASEAN
jls expected to facilitate data exchanges and loans of specialists.
Further, it will be the function of the organization to pursue combined
ASEAN trade missions outside the region and meetings of business organi
zations to achieve trade liberalization measures.
In addition, exchanges of personnel and data in such fields as
transport and telecommunications and publishing.

Moreover, a number of

steps were taken to exchange defense information and in 1968 some leaders
offered suggestions for defense cooperation,-''

These steps represent at

least a mild change in the Asian political environment which has been and
still is t o m by severe ethnic differences and narrow nationalistic
policies.

In many cases, the explanation of the change is the recognition

Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 121,
^11

cooperation in Asia," Washington Post, January 14* 1968, p. 22,
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that the task of economic development can be aided by collaboration with
neighbors.

To date, several noteworthy steps have been taken which

illustrate that there is quiet progress.

T.T.B. Koh lists severalo

38

Though no dramatic breakthroughs have been ma.de the Association has
identified specific areas of cooperation including (l) food production
and supply; (2) communications, air traffic service and meteorology;
(3) civil air transportation; and (4) shipping,,
Further, a mild breakthrough has been make in the field of tourism,,
-f
The five governments have agreed to promote VISIT ASEAN YEAH 1971 through
joint publicity abroad, in order to attract tourists to the ASEAN region
as opposed to individual countries.
---- —

Under consideration is a proposal for

the pooling of passenger rights between the airlines of the memberstates<>-. Under this scheme, only carriers of JsSEAN countries could pick up passengers between points within the region.

The ASEAN fund is another

example of the countries * intentions to cooperate for mutual benefit.
Under this fund, each nation has contributed one million dollars to
finance joint projects approved by the ASEAN ministerial meetings.,
In recent meetings, the ministers gave approval to more than
ninety recommendations concerning regional practices.^9 Many of these
include agreements between two or three nations.

For example, Malaysia,

Thailand, and Indonesia have established a buffer stock arrangement in

3 % “. T. B. Koh, "International Collaboration Concerning Southeast
Asia," The Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 21.
•^Koh, The Armais, p. 22; Also see: "ASEAN: Inching Forward,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 71 (April 3> 1971), pp. 15-16.
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the tin mining industry and Singapore has formed a Joint airline with
Malaysia*

Singapore has also taken steps to reduce taxes for industrialists

forming partnerships, in Indonesia with Indonesian entrepreneurs.

Finally ,

in 1970, though Cambodia is not a member, the Cambodians in 1970 signed
an agreement with Singapore to cooperate in the fields of timber and
' Id
fisheries.
Koh also discusses another aspect of ASEAN which warrants attention.
This is the relationship betvreen the organization and the United Nations.
At the twenty-fifth session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East (ECAFE) heldih April, 1969, a proposal was made that ECAFE con
duct an economic study of the five ASEAN nations and help identify areas
--where closer cooperation might be feasible.
for two reasons.
UN.

This link has significance

First, it enables ASEAN to receive the benefits of the

Second, since ECAFE is somewhat impartial, recommendations made

will be given serious consideration by all member nations.
Another effort in the field of regional cooperation which involves
the five ASEAN countries is the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education
Council (SEAMSC) which m s formed in 1965 by the five ASEAN countries
in addition to Laos and South Vietnam.^®

To date, SEAMEC has given birth

to a Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture, a
Regional Center for Tropical Biology, a Regional Center for Tropical
Medicine and Public Health, a Regional Center for Education in Science,
a Regional English Language Center and a Regional Center for Technology.
Thus, success in these endeavors may provide a source of confidence for

^®Koh, The Annals, p. 22; "ASEAN: Inching Forward," pp. 15-l60
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44
the pursuit of other regional undertakings*
Within the economic sphere, the Southeast Asian nations appear
to have taken at least the first few steps toward economic cooperation*
If achievements in economic cooperation are reflected in accelerated
rates of growth, then it would seem reasonable to expect a continuation
of political support for regionalism*

Further, improvements in economic

conditions should help in reducing the appeals on which insurgents have
operated for many decades*

Yet,it seems absurd to assume that subversive

efforts in the area wall quickly subside.
cooperation may be forthcoming*

Thus, interest in defense

As previously mentioned, this aspect of

regionalism has been discussed, and though substantial efforts have not
been made in this direction, the probability of its emergence seem possible*

Defense Cooperation
Though ASSAM was largely espoused to be organized around the
traditional "safe area" of economic cooperation, the desirability of
expanding its activities into the military area was openly expressed
before the ink v/as dry on the Declaration*^

All the nations of the

association have indicated an interest in regional defense cooperation
and even President Marcos of the Philippines suggested in 1963 that
"an interim security arrangement be made within the framework of ASEAN. "42

B e r n e r Levi, "The Future of Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 10,
No* 4 (April, 1970), p. 350.
^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p« 1220
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The five nations are searching for -ways to provide for their own security
and, while it would be misleading to state that regional defense will
become a reality in the near future, it is significant that the countries
are thinking in these terms and beginning to overlook the extreme nation
alistic tendencies of the paste
The present ASEAM group now represents a sizable portion of the
population, lend mass, and resources that comprise Southeast Asia#

If

this group eventually represents an interconnected regional defense
system, it could take a major stride toward assuming the burden of its
own security#

Against the background of China and the forces which give

reality to regionalism, it is evident that for a multipolar Asia to evolve
there must be a structure in which the United States is not the only
counterweight to China#

This counterweight may take the form of an

ASEAN defense force and, though its development may lag behind economic
cooperation, it may be appropriate for several reasons,,
Initially, it seems to this writer, that SEATG is an inappropriate
model for the future#

Essentially, SSATO is a unilateral American guarantee

with merely the coloring of or a tinge of multilateralism#

In addition,

the leaders of Southeast Asia seek to disassociate themselves from a heavy
dependence on the United States or any other great power#

Finally, with

the advent of the Nixon'Doctrine, a declining U.S. posture and the stated
objective of allowing Asian countries to share more of the burden of de
fending themselves, 3EAT0 appears inappropriate.

Concerning the future of

SEATO, Eichard li7TTi5con has written:
SSATO was useful and appropriate to its time, but
it was Western in origin and drew its strength from
the United States and Europe. It has weakened to
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the point at which it is little more than an insti
tutional embodiment of an American commitment, and a
'somewhat anachronistic relic of the days when France
and Britain were active members. Asia today needs
its own security undertakings, reflecting the new
realities of Asian independence and Asian needs.^
A second reason why defense cooperation appears appropriate con
cerns the development patterns of Asian regionalism.

Asian leaders of

today realize that defense cooperation is an extremely difficult under
taking and that considerable common experience and trust is required
before this form of cooperation can be attempted.
has cemented this point when he said;

Thai Minister Khoman

"Joint economic projects will

provide the ASEAN nations with something they want to join together to
defend."^
A final aspect of the appropriateness of defense cooperation
concerns the nature of the threats in the area.

It seems reasonable to

predict that security threats in the area will be primarily concerned
with defense against low-level operations or insurgent threats.

This

should be a task which the countries of ASEAN are capable of combating
and defeating.

Obviously, the countries of the association cannot meet

the full range of defense functions.

The ultimate security against, for

example, nuclear blackmail or large-scale aggression can only be provided
by a great power.
Perhaps,, if these countries are expected to shoulder more of the
defense burden, they should be assured that the U.S. will maintain the

^Richard M. Nixon, .."Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
No. 1 (October, 1967), p. 115.
^Gordon, Tov/ard Disengagement in Asia, p. 130.
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strategic umbrella, at least for the immediate future.

Though the ASEAN

Declaration stresses the participating nations• stability and security
from external powers and further maintains that all foreign bases are
temporary, this does not seem to preclude the U.S. from temporarily
backstooping the organization.

In brief, assuming the future defense

needs are primarily for counter-insurgent type operations, then it seems
appropriate that capabilities of a joint ASEAN force be used for combating
these lower level threats.
In retrospect, there are three reasons why a joint ASEAN
counterinsurgency force appears feasible.
of SEATO for the future.

First, the shortcomings

Second, when economic growth develops the

countries involved will have an investment worthciefending and finally,__
owing to the likely nature of future threats, nations in the area should
be able to combat them.

If this cooperation does, in fact, become

reality, there are several implications for the United States.
First, concerning the ASEAN member nations, it would appear that
this group includes those nations which can reasonably be regarded as
having at least some of the characteristics of stability insofar as the
region as a whole is concerned.

Resultingly, the U.S. would appear to have

an interest in insuring the security of the five states.

Further,

though formal commitments to Thailand and the Philippines may still exist,
there is a strongly held belief within'the U.S. that commitments in
Southeast Asia should not be enlarged.

Thus, if there is an increasing

interest in regional, defense cooperation, then it would appear that the
United States can hardly fail to benefit.

Third, a policy of continued

American disengagement may help to-galvanize Asians into accelerating
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their plans for self-reliance— much as Britain’s announced withdrawal
from Malaysia led Malaysia to consider regional defense cooperation.
Last, obviously a policy of disengagement cannot be pursued
without restraint.

However, if a policy of disengagement is followed,

it may lead to a relaxation of China’s attitude toward United States
"containment.”

To cite an example, both Thailand ana the U.S. will

benefit if China finds less reason to believe that the Bangkok govern
ment is an American puppet.

Yet, only some reduction in Thailand’s

heavy dependence on the United States is likely to produce such a change
in Chinese thinking.

An ASEAN defense force might be a major step toward

convincing the Thais that it is feasible to reduce dependence on American
guarantees and, thus, convince China that Thailand is not a provocative
neighbor— possibly reducing the threat from Peking.
From the aforementioned implications, it appears that three
primary guidelines emerge for a United States foreign policy toward
Southeast Asian nations.

First, groupings of certain states represent

a development generally favorable to American interests and should
probably be encouraged.

Second, regional security cooperation should

not be seized upon as a justification for premature withdrawals.

We

must insure that .ASEAN and other defense capabilities are not overestimated.
Finally, the United States must encourage the interest and cooperation
of the one nation of the area that possesses enormous capacity for sup
porting ASEAN and the nations of Southeast Asia— Japan.

CHAPTER III

JAPAN, SOVIET UNION, AND THE
EMERGENCE OF QUADRILATERAL BALANCE

Japan
The role which Japan decides to play in Southeast Asia may be
one of the most important factors in the future of the area.

In a press

conference on April 7, 1954# President Eisenhower stated:
In its economic aspects, loss of Indochina would take
away that region that Japan must have as a trading
area, or it would force Japan to run toward the
communist areas in order to live. The consequences
of the loss of Japan to the free world'are just
incalculable.
Carl Oglesby— writing in his essay on Containment and Change— refers to
Japan as "an extremely critical element," and he sets forth the following
propositions.*

First, Japan's economic strength is the crucial element

in America's policy of containing China and maintaining peace in Asia.
Japan is the bastion.

Second, with the exception of Canada, Japan is

our leading trading partner and is of major commercial Importance.

Third,

if China and Japan develop economic interdependency, then the brute
mathematics of the relationship may doom Japan to juniority— much as
Britain would be junior to an economically integrated European continent.

^William A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicagoj
Rand McNally Company, 1956), p. 1119.
2
Carl Oglesby, Containment and Change (Toronto: Macmillan Company,
1967), p. 123.
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If Japan has no long-term alternative to massive Chinese trade,
she will be left without an alternative to a progressively more pro-Chinese
orientation.

Last, Japan’s only chance for a long-term alternative to

the developing market of China lies with the more slowly-developing and
less organizable markets of the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia’s now buried treasures mean that her markets, once
developed, will exert a great pull on Japan— the trader— regardless
of who develops them.

Thus, Oglesbjr concludes:

what Japan and the

U.S. face in the Pacific is the formation of a regional economic system
which must include Japan, would quite likely be dominated by China,
and whose potential and power in the Pacific would be considerable.^
Recently (April, 1971) the Japanese Ambassador to the United
States delivered a lecture at the Naval "war College and stated:
Two-way trade between Japan and the United States has
grown rapidly since the 1950s and is approaching
310 billion this year. This is the largest volume
of overseas trade between any two nations in the
world. Only United States-Canadian trade is larger.^
In addition, about 30 per cent of Japan's international trade is with
the United States, and this fact caused one journalist to remark,
cannot afford an American growth rate as low as 3/^.

"Japan

Outside the United

States, the region of greatest importance to the Japanese economy is South
east Asia which accounted for about 29 per cent of Japan's trade in 1968.^

^Oglesby, Containment and Change, p. 129.
%obuhiko Ushiba, "Japan: Her. Role in'-World Affairs,"
College Review, Vol. 23, No. 8 (April, 1971), p. 18.

Naval War

% a x Hays, "Why Japan's Growth is Different," Fortune (November,
1967), p. 246.
^James M. Elster, "The United States-Japan Alliance," Naval far
College Review, Vol. 22, No. 5 (January, 1970), p. 26.
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To maintain this pattern the Japanese have advocated a.multi
lateral .system of development-which stresses accumulation of capital,
development of technology and improvement of management ability.

Thus,

given Japanese dependence on Southeast Asian markets, the significance
of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam in 1964 ^ 6 196$ was not so much the
decision to fight communism but the decision to underwrite the develop
ment of the entire region.

The U.S. exported nearly $4-billion to Japan

in 1969,^ an amount nearly equal to that exported to Britain and France
combined.
Presently, the Japanese economy is outstripping almost every
other in the world (with-the possible exception of the United States).
It is growing at an annual rate of 10 per cent, ranks number three in the
world in total GNP (Gross National Product) and leading Japanese economists
are now considering proposals to double the GNP in the next twenty
years.®

(In addition, Japan enjoys secure sea lanes owing to the

presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.)

According to former U.S. Ambassador

to Japan, Edwin 0. Reischauer, "Almost half the energy sources on which
Japan lives— the oil of the Middle East— passes through the straits of
M a l a c c a .

The sea lanes are an extremely vital factor in the security

of the island nation.

In addition to oil, numerous other materials move

in and out of Japan by sea.

These include iron ore, cotton, lumber, wool,

^Alexis Johnson, "Jaoan and Future American Relations," The Annals,
Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 6 5 .
®Ushiba, "Japan:

Her Role in World Affairs," p. 19.

9j?dwin 0. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam (New York:
Company, 1968), p. 133,

Alfred A. Knopf
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and foodstuffs.
Finally, in 1970, the Japanese Foreign Office released figures
which indicate that the island nation now enjoys a substantially higher
per capita income than do the 200 million people of the Soviet Union.
This only're-emphasizes the fact that Japan has reached the point where
she can now make new and more extensive contributions to stability and
progress in Asia.

It seems obvious that Japan has, in fact, been given

a ’’free ride" in the Southeast Asian situation.

However, with the im

plementation of the "low posture” policy, she may no longer be able to
maintain her lack of military presence.
The Vietnam experience has certainly convinced many Americans
that there is something fundamentally wrong with a strategy which re
quires the United States to assume the military burden while Japan
channels its energy into the relatively secure business of developmental
assistance and proceeds to trade with all the combatants, simultaneously,
in a particular conflict.

If the somewhat close alliance betvreen the

U.S. and the island nation is to continue, then a much more equitable
balance will have to be cemented in the respective roles.

This very

factor caused former Secretary of Defense KacNamara to remark:
If, for example, other nations really believe,
as they say they do, that it is in the common interest
to deter the expansion of Red China's economic and
political control beyond its nations! boundaries, then
they must take a more active role in guarding the
defense perimeter*H

Johnson, "Japan and

Future American Relations," p« 65o

^Robert S. MacKamara, The Essence of Security (Hew York: Harper
and Row Company, 1963), p. 156c
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There can be little doubt that Japan possesses the capacity for a
much enlarged role in Southeast Asia in both the economic and defense
spheres.

However, it is also apparent that gaining the island nation’s

economic sooperation will be much easier than obtaining a larger
participation in defense and security.

Japan, is already substantially

involved in Asia and has important interests in the development of
Southeast Asia.
objectives:

Foreign Minister Aichi has stated as one of Japan’s

"To create a Southeast Asia free from war, wre have to join

hands with each other for the cause of development and stability.

It is

f

in this spirit that Japan will be a partner in joint efforts of the South
east Asian countries to advance toward a bright future."12
This was- a call for-economic cooperation leading, to a peaceful__
future, and it cannot be overemphasized that Japan has a tremendous
economic stake in Southeast Asia,

Even in 1967, Japan had 23 per cent

of Southeast Asian trade, completely overshadowing Communist China,
replacing former European nations, and surpassing the

U . S .

13

Further,

Japan is the first or second leading trade partner with every nation in
the area with the exception of Cambodia where it is third,^4
More significant is the fact that in recent years, Japan has enlarged
its role in regional affairs and has become active in several regional
programs.

For example, in 1966 the;/ participated in the conference on

^james Buck, "Japan’s Defense Options," Asian Survey, Vol. 10,
No. 10 (October, 1970), p. 896.
l^Donald C. Heilman, "The Emergence of an East Asian Subsystem,"
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December, 1969), p. 429.
•^Ibid.

Asian Agricultural Development, joined in multilateral aid to Indonesia
(1967), joined the Asian and Pacific Council in 1966, and pledged
$200 million to the Asian Development Bank while providing that organ

ization’s first president.

The Asian and Pacific Council was formed at

Seoul in June of 1966 with nine members— South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia,
Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Nationalist China, South Vietnam and
Japan.
The initial goal of ASPAC was purely economic cooperation through
a regional bank to handle development of rice and an international
technician pool.^

This may have been the price of Japanese participation

as the organization has voiced little support for defense undertakings.
....—

does not seem too unrealistic to assume- that Japan will,-no doubt,---

play an increasingly constructive role in Asian economic cooperation.
Moreover, Japan seems to look upon her economic power as the primary way
she can combat the security threat in Asia.

Writing- in Naval War College

Review, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States wrote in 1971:
The security threat in Asia seems to be not so much
a danger of large-scale aggression by one country
against another as it is the type of clandestine sup
port that one country might give to a group in a second
country for ideological reasons. Such support would be
based upon social and political unrest in the second
country. The unrest which invites this type of aggression
is largely caused by the kind of poverty which now exists
throughout much of Asia. And the poverty problem in
Asia, home to over one-half of the total world population,
, is staggering. In this context, Japan’s duty is clear.
She must use her new- economic strength to help bring
about the stability and strength in the Far Bast that is

■^"Japan’s Economy GroT.\dng,n

New York Times, June 16, 1966, p0 21.
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necessary to the enduring peace of that region,^
In essence, Japan is already somewhat active in the economic sphere
within Southeast Asia,

However, the sphere of defense cooperation is

quite another matter.

At present, the 261,000 man ’’self-defense" force

cannot be legally deployed outside Japan and recent surveys indicate that
an overwhelming number of Japanese feel that no military arms should go to
Southeast Asia,17

This survey also caused Mendel to conclude:

The pacifist organization and nuclear allergy of the
vast majority of the Japanese public, including the
younger generation often assumed to have forgotten the
lessons of World War II and the Pacifist Occupation
Reforms, is clearly evident in all of the data presented
above. No 'one should fear or expect Japan to assume
a military containment role in the 1970’s.-^
It is worthy of mention, however, that some new trends in Japanese
defense policy have been noted recently.

Briefly, Japan vri.ll no longer

depend completely on the Japanese-United States Security Treaty of i960
but will assume more of the burden for her own defense.

This fits in

with the Nixon Doctrine, whereby nations assume prime responsibility for
their ovm defense but obviously this cannot be interpreted to mean that
they will play a greater role in the defense of other Asian nations.

The

new program will primarily strengthen the naval defense force and seems
to reflect an increasing consciousness of Japan’s dependence on the sea
19
•lanes.

In addition, the promised return of Okinawa in 1972 is reflected

■^Ushiba, "Japan: Her Role in World Afairs," p. 17o
17
Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Defense in the 1970's: The Public
View," Asian Survey, Vol, 10, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 1056.
l8Ibid., p. 1068.
19Kobun Ito, "JaDan’s Security in the 1970’s," Asian Survey, Vol. 10,
No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 1033.
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in the new policy of added self-reliance.

These facts have caused some

"Japan watchers" to argue that the dominant thrust of Japanese policy
today is not toward the sharing of containment burdens in Southeast Asia
but rather toward a military disengagement from the United States,^®
In addition to the naval building program, The Economist of
October 28, 1967 (pp. 434-36) indicates that during 1968 and 1969 Japan
was scheduled to produce 60 fighter aircraft, 45 reconnaissance types,
45 large helicopters and 55 small copters.

Further, literally thousands

of trucks and small arms were scheduled for production.

Moreover, by 1972,

Japan will possess three battalions each of Hawk and Hercules missiles and
plans were being made for the production of the U.S.-designed F-4 Phantom
fighters.

Last, with China producing.nuclear weapons, this possibility

is no longer anathema as it was during the 1950's,

Japan is rapidly de

veloping nuclear power for peaceful purposes and according to one
evaluation is now producing enough plutonium to produce "one atom bomb
a month o"^When queried about acquisition and production of nuclear weapons,
the Japanese Ambassador to the United States has given a flat "Mo"
answer and cited several reasons, including, the overwhelming negative
feeling of the Japanese people, the prohibition by the Constitution, fear
of neighboring countries and numerous others.

22

Though some new trends

^OElster, "The United States-Japan Alliance," p, 35o
21

Charlotte Saikowski, "Japan T o m by Nuclear Dilemma," Christian
Science Monitor, April 27, 1968, p. 13,
2%shiba, "Japan:

Her Role in World Affairs," p, 1034o
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are surfacing in the Japanese defense posture, they are not of the mag
nitude to be referred to as a significant change.

As Ito has remarked,

"It is vdser for Japan to promote good will through cultural and economic
cooperation with countries along Japan's sea routes and to meet security
requirements by political rather than military

m e a s u r e s , 11^

The Japanese Foreign Minister commenting on a simple transfer
of Southeast Asian peace-keeping responsibilities from the U.S. to Japan
has further stated: "Japanese public opinion is simply not prepared for
such an undertaking; nor I believe, would the other free nations welcome
it.

For some time to come there will be no substitute for the continuing

presence of American deterrent power."24
It seems apparent that it is highly unlikely that Japan would ever
rise up completely from her low-military posture and undertake a large
program of rearmament with nuclear weapons and missile capability. How
ever, the enormous increases in Japanese economic power and Japan's in
creasing involvement in the economies of Southeast Asia- would seem to
indicate a growing concern and interest for the stability and security
of that region.
Thus, Japan shares the interest of seeing Southeast Asia remain
stable and at the same time is not willing to play any facsimile of an
activist role in the defense of this interest.

There is a certain ambiva

lence and this may be the attraction that the concept of a joint ASIAN-type

^Ito, "Japan's Security in the 1970's," p, 1034®
^Kiichi Aichi, "Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 4-3, No. 2 (October, 1969), p« 31.
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security force may present to Japanese leaders.

The reasons for this lie

in the fact that Japan could make an important contribution to the security
of Asia, t 're counterbalance of China, and the defeat of insurgencies
without becoming directly and unilaterally involved.

If aid were channeled

through the United Nations, it would also be vatbin the scope of the
Japanese; Constitution.
Support for a regional counterinsurgency force, such as might evolve
from organization similar to ASSAM, could eventually represent an acceptable
mid-range step for Japan.

Obviously, technical training assistance and

v small arms supply to a force of this type would appear to be much less
provocative to China than a Japanese decision to unilaterally rearm.

In

addition, it would provide a convenient rationale for Japan to maintain
her arms industry and with U.S. sanction may be more palatable than uni
lateral efforts.

Japan could contribute small arms, economic assistance,

and perhaps, technical advisors rather than making massive troop commit
ments.
Lucian Pye has remarked, '’Even limited cooperation among a few
of the Southeast Asian states can provide the necessary formula for
bringing Japan effictively into the process of supporting the Asian
balance of power.

However, one is forced to conclude that major

Japanese defense participation in Southeast Asia is unlikely during the
next decade.

Support of an ASEAN-type counterinsurgency force is within

the realm of possibility, but Japan looks upon her role as primarily

25Lucian W. Pye, "China in Context," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45,
No. 2 (January, 1967), p. 235*

r
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economic.

The words of a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and one of the

leading scholars on the island nation seem, to have merit:

"do not expect

Japan to play more than an economic role in Asia during the next

d e c a d e . "^6

The emergence of Japan accounts for the third of the four great
power nations that are presently becoming active in Southeast Asia.

The

fourth nation is the Soviet Union.

Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has become considerably more active in Southeast
Asia since the American military disengagement has begun.

At an interna

tional meeting in Moscow on June 5, 1969, Leonid Brezhev first spoke of
"collective security for Southeast Asia."

27

This was generally inter

preted to mean economic security and according to Gurtov was simply a
signal to the nation of the area that the Soviets maintained an interest.
Most important, however, the move was designed to undermine the influence
of mainland China0
In brief, the Soviet Union has been attempting to prevent the
area from becoming a Chinese sphere of influence, and Gurtov- and others
are of the opinion that statements of Soviet leaders are evidence of
this.

28

China has been considerably irked by Soviet contracts with Taiwan

and contacts with Japan concerning timber harvests in Siberia, docking :

26sdwin 0. Reischauer, "The Future of Japan," Asian Survey, Vol. 9,
No. 8 (August, 1969), p. 639.
^Melvin Gurtov, "Sino-Soviet Relations and Southeast Asia," Pacific
Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Vinter, 1971), P- 500.
28nThe Soviet Union in Asia," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 71
(March 20, 1971), p. 20.
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rights and access to sea lanes.

Further, negotiations have begun between

the Soviets and Thailand concerning commercial aviation and trade agree
ments.

Finally, the Soviets have approached India concerning basing

privileges and have executed an agreement with Singapore concerning ex
panded port facilities for Soviet ships,,
These facts have served to enhance the Chinese-Soviet split and have
caused stiffer competition between them.
Badgley remarks,

Regarding these facts, John

"Sino-Soviet relations are deeply disturbed and will not

be resolved, both because of the territorial and prestige factors and

29
because of the competition for worldleadership." 7 Toward the end of
the 1960*s , China had acquired an independent nuclear capacity of a sort
— and-•was pursuing her self-reliant policies; border clashes even posed the
danger of war between the two major communist powers.

Further, China

underwent a traumatic internal upheaval in 1965-1966— The Cultural
Revolution.
To some degree, the "Cultural Revolution" reoriented China’s outlook
inward resulting in diplomatic isolation.

Perhaps, the Chinese are

preoccupied with the dual problem of rebuilding China's political system
at home as well as by the threat of conflict with the Soviets.
1969,

During

the Soviet-Chinses conflict reached its maximum danger point.

For several years, China had resorted to demonstration on the Chinese-

^John H. Badgley, "The American Presence in Asia." The Annals.
Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 41.
3%arold C. Hinton, "Conflict on the Ussuri," Problems of Communism,
Vol. 20 (April, 1971), p. 66.
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Soviet border and had expressed defiance of "Soviet Revisionism."
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As the locus of the 1969 demonstration, the Chinese chose the disputed is
land of Chenpao, in the Ussuri River, which had been the scene of similar
demonstrations in the past.
Subsequently, according to the Soviet version of the incident
(which has gained acceptance, according to Hinton), Chinese troops set
an ambush for an outnumbered Soviet patrol in the early hours of March 2.
In the ensuing firefight, the Soviets incurred heavy casualties,.

Sub

sequently, on March 15, the Soviets ambushed a Chinese patrol and in a
larger battle obtained a clearcut victory.

These clashes caused Senator

Edward Kennedy to remark:
__

The deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations in the ___ _
wake of the recent border clashes may be stimulating
at least some of the leaders in Peking to re-evaluate
their posture toward the U.S. and provide us with an
extraordinary opportunity to break the bonds of dis
trust.
Minor clashes have continued to occur at scattered frontier points

and China has become increasingly concerned with security of nuclear
weapons installations in Sinkiang province.
incidents of 1969, both

However, since the major

have attempted to avoid major frontier incidents.

The Chinese continue to display uncompromising political and ideological
hostility toward Moscow and the increased relations between-the. Soviets"
and U.S. probably have Peking worried.

The Salt Talks, Soviet Treaty with

3libid., p. 47.
^ A . Doak Barnett, The U.S. and China: The Next Decade (New York:
Praeger Company, 1970), p. 155.
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West Germany, the absence of an American-Soviet confrontation over
Cambodia are all sources of concern to Peking.
At present, the split is much less volatile than in 1969*

A

navigation agreement has been reached, a new Chinese Ambassador has been
sent to Moscow and various negotiations are continuing.

Further, name

calling has declined, and according to Hinton, "The cult of Mao has
clearly declined."

33

In any event, there seems little doubt that the

Soviet presence in Southeast Asia is looked upon as a threat to Peking
and to some degree may account for the initiation of overtures

toward

the U.S. in 1971— the advent of "ping-pong diplomacy."
A veteran Asian expert, Sydney Liu, has remarked, "despite the
olive branch that Leonid Brezhnev extended to Peking at the Soviet Party
Congress in April, 1971, Moscow and Peking remain bitter foes and both
have continued to reinforce their garrisons along the 4,000 mile border
between t h e m , R e c e n t l y , the Soviets have begun to expand diplomatic,
economic, and military influence in the area that China has traditionally
considered to be its own backyard.

One Western diplomat remarked:

"The

Russians aren't coming to Southeast Asia, they have already arrived."35
Today, it is common to see Soviet seamen, diplomats, officials,
and airline crews in many of the countries of Southeast Asia.

Singapore

and Malaysia have already established full diplomatic relations with

33ninton, "Conflict on the Ussuri," p. 66.

^Sydney Liu, "Russia in Southeast Asia,"
No. 15 (April 12, 1971), p. 49.

Newsweek, Vol. 77,
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Moscow, and the Philippines is expected to do so in the near future.

The

reason for the acceptance of the Soviet presence seems to be the fundamental
change in attitudes of the leaders of the countries of the area.
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew declared:

Singapore's

"The'-Soviet Naval capacity in the

Indian Ocean and the South China Sea can be a counterpoise to China's
weight . . . on the littoral countries of Asia and Southeast Asia."
Another diplomat from Singapore remarked,

36

"Frankly, the only way for us

and most of the other nations in Southeast Asia to preserve our
independence is to have a balance of the big powers in the area."-^7
Individual countries tend to view the Soviet presence from different
perspectives.

For example, Laos and Cambodia can point to their Russian

embassies as pr'oof of their neutrality in international affairs while the
-Thais see: the Soviet presence as an alternative to Japan's hold on
Thai economy and have signed a trade agreement with Moscow.

In Malaysia,

the Soviet Embassy staff has grown considerably since relations began
in 1968.

The two countries are now conducting negotiations concerning

aid for reorganization of the Malaysian Navy.
Further, the Soviets have been very careful and cautious in order
to avoid their old revolutionary image.

They try hard to show that

they are unlike the savage, unreasonable Chinese Maoists and are
instead, "good Communists."

In addition, they have not hesitated to

criticize insurgent groups that have a Peking orientation.

36iiu, "Russia in Southeast Asia," p. 49.
37Ibid.

For example,

in Cambodia, a Soviet diplomat referred to an insurgent group as, "a
few hungry peasants”; and in Thailand, a Soviet official commented, "the
Guerrillas are merely a bunch of jungle b a n d i t s . L a s t , in Ceylon, it
vras reported on April 22, 1971, that Russian advisors and equipment were
being given to the Ceylon government to combat an insurgency initiated
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by the so-called, "Che Guevarists.”^7
In brief, there is now a fourth major power operating in
Southeast Asia and attempting to fill any vacuum remaining from the
declining American presence.

It might be argued that the Soviets will

never have the strength to match the U.S'. economic and military presence.
However, the Soviets seem to be making a move in this direction, and it
seems reasonable to assume that their presence will be increased during
the 1970s.

The opinion that the U.S. must fight to keep the Soviets

out of Southeast Asia at all costs has been expounded by some American
diplomats in the area,^® and seems to be testimony to the fact that
McCarthyism is alive and well and living in American diplomatic circles
of Southeast Asia.

Koivever, one American diplomat had a much more

enlightened opinion concerning the Soviet presence.

He stated:

"I

think the time has come when we are going to have to live with the
Soviets in all areas of the world, including this one."^

3%,iu, "Russia in Southeast Asia,” p. 50.
-^"Ceylon, All the Way with Che?” Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 71 (April 3, 1971), p. 8.
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Thus, now emerging simultaneously with regionalism is a quadri
lateral relationship between the United States, China, Japan and the
Soviet Union.

This new relationship in the area among the great powers

is the result of three basic factors.
Union and the Communist Chinese.

The split between the Soviet

The re-emergence of Japan as the number

three economic power in the world, and finally, the movement of the U.S.
toward a decreasing military involvement and a ''low postTore" in the future

Emergence of Quadrilateral Balance
In a sense, therefore, the pattern of great power relations in
Southeast Asia in the 1970s will likely be a quadrilateral one, and
appears that it will be fundamentally different from the pattern
- rexisting in the recent past.- There-are several reasons- for-thisj- -----First, each of the four .powers can be expected to pursue its interests
with independence.

Virtually everything each power does will have

important implications and repercussions for the other three.

For

example, the Soviets may try to expand relations with Japan and other
nations, thus competing against both the Chinese and Americcan. influence.
At times, however, some Soviet policies may parallel those of
the United States and, thus, China may fear Soviet-American collusion.
Peking, in order to strengthen its position against Moscow, may well
decide to initiate more flexible policies toward the U.S. or even Japan;
subsequently, Moscow may be apprehensive about Chinese-American coopera
tion that could become anti-Soviet.

Japan provides another example.

While pursuing more independent policies she will have an interest in
improved relations with both Peking and Moscow but may find that improved
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relations with-one can have an adverse effect on relations with the
other.

Further, if Tokyo goes too far in expanding relations with

either, it may cause considerable uneasiness in Washington.

Finally,

the United States will probably want to preserve its alliance with
Japan and maintain a balance in U.S.-Soviet relations but will likely
continue to push— to Moscow's chagrin— for a lessening of tension with
Peking.
Though these factors may appear to be destabilizing elements,
there will very likely be limits on the extent to which any of the
four cowers will be able to manipulate the balance to its advantage.
There are two reasons why the situation may be stabilizing rather than
destabilizing.

First, it does not seem likely that there will be major

relalignments among any of the four powers that could upset the balance..
If, for example, Chinese-Soviet relations improve, it seems unlikely
that the alliance could be restored to the status of the early 1950s.
If Chinese-American relations improve, significant barriers still exist
to deter close relations— the Taiwan question, ideological differences,
and so forth.
If Japan expands its relations with one of the Communist powers,
a break with the United States would be improbable as Japan's economic
interests are closely linked with ours.

If the Soviets and Americans

sometimes.adopt parallel positions against the Chinese, the basic
divergencies of interest would likely prevent complete collaboration.
From the United States standpoint, the possibility of lessening.tensions
with China will likely have appeal, both to provide a counterweight to
the Soviets and to alleviate the confrontation with China.
Second, the balance may help to reduce the. likelihood of large-

power military conflicts for several reasons.

None of the four powers,

in considering military involvements, will be able to ignore the possible
reactions of all the other powers.

For example, Peking's apprehension

about a hostile Soviet Union at its back will impose new limits on its
policies elsewhere, and Moscow's uncertainty about American and Japanese
(as well as Chinese.) reactions to action it might take should operate
to reinforce other constraints against such action.
Further, all four of the major powers, each with its own interests
and views, will be involved in situations throughout the region; and
instead of bipolar confrontations, more and .more situations will involve
complicated patterns-of competition, cooperation, and parallel actions.
...It seems likely that as a ..result of these factors, the quadrilateral.__
balance may create a complex pattern of mutual constraints that could
operate to inhibit and limit large-power intervention in local military
conflicts and may encourage the pursuit of goals through diplomatic and
economic maneuvering and competition.
Hopefully, the complexities created by this balance may reduce the
dangers of local conflicts which could invite big-power intervention in
some of the sensitive areas of tension.

Taiwan is a good example.

Peking has not been reckless in its approach to Taiwan recently.

However,

in the 1950s when it felt it was backed by the alliance with the
Soviets, the Chinese -were quite willing to initiate military probes to
see if the U.S. could be dislodged.

The inhibitions to these probes

will not sunport Peking in any action against Taiwan.
Actually, Moscow has mildly hinted that it would like to develop

unofficial contacts with the Nationalist Chinese.^2
Japan has frequently stated that,

jn addition,

"The maintenance of peace and security

in the Taiwan area is a most important factor for the security of Japan.
In essence, the four-power balance has created new constraints which
enlarge the risks and costs that night be involved for Peking if it were
to consider military action against Taiwan.

Admittedly, there are

several factors which could upset the emerging balance in Southeast Asia.
In brief, a quadrilateral'relationship among the great powers is emerging
in Southeast Asia somewhat simultaneously with Asian regionalism.

^2A. Doak Barnett, "The New Multipolar Balance in East Asia," The
Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 78.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Toward Non-al ignment
The era of direct American presence and assistance in Southeast
Asia seems to be ending.

In countries such as Thailand and South

Vietnam (which have depended on the U.S. for many decades) it is
apparent that the U.S. is now looking to Asian leaders to seize the
initiative and establish the economic and defense goals for their respec
tive countries.

To some extent progress is being made through regional

economic and defense cooperation.

Hov/ever^ regiohalismis still in an

infantile state and requires proper support of larger nations.

Simul

taneously emerging in the area is the quadrilateral balance comprised of
the four great powers.

If a stable and productive Southeast Asia is

to evolve in the future then it would appear that these two forces
must be compatible and not mutually exclusive.
The emergence of a quadrilateral balance in Southeast Asia may
provide a background from which regionalism can make greater progress
and achieve self-sufficiency if the great powers participate in a manner
which does not rob the arrangement of its Southeast Asian character.
Essentially, the main participants in the regional organizations must
be the states of the region and the institutions created must be their
own.

There are several reasons for this.

First, the anxieties of the

new states concerning foreign intervention would be tempered and their
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self-respect strengthened.

Further, a purely Asian arrangement would,

be more responsive to nationalist demands for independence, equality,
and status.
Second, this arrangement would hamper the widespread practice
in Asia of requesting outside intervention in support of factions or
states engaged in internal or international conflicts.

Without imme-

. diate outside support, the governments of Southeast Asia may be induced
to rely increasingly upon themselves.

They may, resultingly, devote their

energies to internal development and subsequently, decrease "power
vacuums."

This safeguarding of orderly conditions in a region by the

local states themselves will lessen the inducement or need for larger outside
nations to become involved and the absence of outside influence may
discourage intra-regional strife.
Obviously, a purely Asian arrangement will not be welcome to
certain governments as their internal political security may be weakened
without external support and the inability to play one outside nation
against another may cause a decrease in the power of a certain state.
Yet, it would appear that these very roles are a major contributing
factor to political unrest in Southeast Asia.

Ending them is paramount

for a more secure foundation for the region’s future.

The existence

of a government by the tie of complete' military and economic support
•from an outside power is simply incompatible with nationalist sentiments
. that Asian leaders instill in their people.

.The. major-powers do not

cherish this situation either and the U.S., China,, and the Soviet Union
have all urged new states to insure their, viability by means of their
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own efforts.
The whole purpose of a future arrangement for Southeast Asia
must be to enhance the viability of the states of the region— thus,
the determination of the meaning of viability cannot be left to the
determination of a certain government at a certain moment.

Controversy

and opposition will be barriers, on the path to a future Southeast Asian
arrangement.

Inevitably, innovations will hurt some and benefit others.

Nevertheless, an Asian arrangement appears objectively as the most de
sirable solution of the region's political problems from the standpoint
of the Southeast Asian states, as such, and not any particular group
%dthin them.

The obvious prerequisite of success is ths.t the arrange

ment be sufficiently attractive to enough leaders to serve the interests
of the regional states— mainly, independent survival in a peaceful
atmosphere.
The key element in the implementation of any arrangement is an
organization of Southeast Asian states for close, often collective,
cooperation in all field including military.

The organization's political

orientation must be toward non-alignment; it must not become part of any
other regional organization or alliance system.

Several organizations

have been created since the.end of World War II, though fevr included
military matters, and none passed the embryonic stage.

The translation

of good intentions into working systems has been prevented by emotional
hostilities, nationalism and,so forth.. Regardless, these schemes \irere

^Werner Levi, "The Future of Southeast Asia," Asian Survey,
Vol. 10, No. 4 (April, 1970), p. 352.
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indicative of a perceived need.

ASEAN is the latest manifestation of

this need but in contrast to other plans the talk surrounding ASEAN has
included- military matters.

Regionalism Heeds Impetus
Though this association has made strides in many areas, it has
not as yet undertaken any military arrangements other than conferences.
It appears that regional cooperation needs added impetus in most areas
and that several advantages need to be stressed to the leaders of the
nations of the area.

One general advantage from a regional organization

would be the breaking of a vicious circle that has throttled the states
of the region since independence.

There has been an acute lack of

— machinery available to settle -peacefully the many conflicts "disturbing
regional relations; yet no machinery has been created because of these
many conflicts.

The only systems for conflict resolution at the states’ ■

disposal is either global organizations or organizations with an Asian
focus in which non-Asian nations participate.
Suspicion and distrust many times prevents the regional states
from seriously considering the use of these organizations for conflict
resolution.

Certain states argue that non-Asians cannot understand the

culture-bound character of their conflicts and thus, cannot contribute
to their resolve.

For example, it is difficult to settle major ter

ritorial claims, which .originated in defunct pre-colonial institutions,
with the rules of a twentieth century legal system.

It is even more

frustrating to attempt to resolve political tensions based on Confucian
or other Asian concepts (such as tribute paying) with the help of a

73

modern international system within which much concepts are archaic or
unknown.

Thus, an Asian regional organization, could supplement global

institutions, and at the same time satisfy Asian demands by suggesting
solutions of conflicts and,, further, by suggesting solutions of problems
before they become conflicts.

This would be done by methods adjusted

to the needs of Asians and acceptable to them.
A second advantage of regional organizations which should be
stressed is the opportunity afforded representatives of regional states
to join in frequent and informed meetings.

In this situation, they

would not feel the need to individually maintain a status of equality and
prestige with the mors powerful nations and would not have to fear "neo-col
onial” schemes or other conspiracies behind proposals of an economic or
political nature.

Further, they would not have to attempt to outdo each

other in either wooing or dondemning outsiders.

Rather, they could devote

themselves to constructive discussions of common problems and ways of
solving them.

Last, they could overcome mutual ignorance which has pre

viously contributed to the perpetuation of age-old animosities and a
complete absence of common effort.

Subsequently, political tension could

be reduced and political cooperation improved.
Another advantage would be the increase in political influence
for each state through common action.

Economic development could be

furthered through coordinated planning and joint execution of common
programs.

Ifnen economic aid is given and received for truly.economic

purposes, its value could be enhanced by channeling it through the or
ganization; where it is intended for political purposes the organization
could make:it'less■risky.

Many of these points have been clearly.

.
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recognized by many regional states.

However, plans for economic

cooperation are less likely to occur under adverse political circumstances.
The reverse may be true as veil.

A regional organisation must deal with

all areas of international relations.

Only a comprehensive organization

can, in the long ruin, ameliorate the disturbing influence of one area
upon another.

Only in a comprehensive organization can the full advantage

of success in one area be made to benefit all the other areas.
There is no assumption here that creation of an all-encompassing
regional organization is an easy matter.
overcome.

There are numerous obstacles to

Nationalist feelings still run high in many countries, and

the people have yet to develop a group identity as Southeast Asians.
The personal ambitions of certain leaders and inexperience in regional

..

intercourse are additional limitations and there are others that could
be mentioned.

However, the importance of emotionally conditioned in

terests may fade in the wake of immediate and vital problems that are
constantly demanding solutions.

The attraction of a regional organization

is that it can satisfy some of the emotional needs as well as the physical
needs.

Support of Great Powers Needed
Many of the governments in Southeast Asia are aware of this
potential but are hesitant because of uncertainty concerning the oositions of major powers.

In brief, the great powers, especially the

United States and Soviet Union could hasten the process of regionalism.
The self-denial that would be demanded of these powers could be expected
only if they considered an independent, comprehensive organization ad-

75
vantageous to themselves.

There is some evidence to indicate that they

do consider such an organization advantageous.

Both are attempting to

prevent one nation from dominating the area and have primarily directed
their efforts toward China.

In Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the

world, non-aligned states can act as buffers between these two major
powers as well as between either of them and China,,
As previously mentioned, the United States has consistently
supported moves for regional organizations and welcomed the creation
of ASSAN.

Limiting China's power through a regional organization would

cater to the basic U.S. policy of preventing one nation from dominating
the area.

The Soviet Union, by developing closer relations with many

of the states of the area, already has-made her interest known.

From

-

the strictly American viewpoint, the filling of any vacuum by a regional
organization rather than Soviets may be preferable but it may not be
unrealistic to assume that they may be preferable to the Soviets as well.
The Soviets, like the United States, are primarily concerned with
preventing China from filling any position the American and British
withdrawals from the area might leave open.

Presumably, the Soviets

most likely would not cherish (any more than the U.S.) the idea of being
the "Marshall Dillon" of Southeast Asia but are actively engaged in the
political isolation and even the military encirclement of China.
Brezhnev’s suggestion for a collective security system for Southeast
Asia-indicates that the creation of a regional organization is at least
a possibility for Soviet policy.
Peking’s attitude toward any regional organization is much more
difficult to project.

If Peking were faced with haveiny to accent the
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best possible rather than an ideal arrangement it might be reconciled
to the existence of a regional organization.

There seems little doubt

that China would interpret such an organization,as directed specifically
against her and would be partially correct.

Most likely Peking would

prefer hegemony over at least parts of Southeast Asia and likely will,
in the long run, aim at it.

In the meantime, China has made no open

moves to expand beyond small border areas.

She has made it clear that

Worth Korea and Worth Vietnam are considered vital for security, and she
would not tolerate the physical presence of an outside power0
These border areas are undoubtedly considered to constitute China’s
sphere of influence, and it is likely that the closer the spheres of
other nations are located to those of China, the tighter control that--Peking would want over its sphere.

The existence of a wide non-aligned

grouping in Southeast Asia could actually alleviate Chinese fears by
broadening her security belt.

The bargain for China would be to trade

a relatively firm control over immediate border areas for a lesser in
fluence in a much wider buffer zone.

Peking would also have to be make

aware that the organization could hardly be a threat to her security.
At best, it would be a defense system in relation to China, and even its
deterrent effect might be inadequate without the assistance of outsiders.
In any event, the American disengagement is unlikely to open new
possibilities for Chinese expansion since the Soviets are already
foreclosing on them vrith a small but active presence.

The Chinese may

dislike a Soviet penetration even more than an American one.

The pros

pect of the U.S. and the Soviets implementing their policies in a manner
to thwart Peking's influence must be a ‘nightmare to the Chinese,

For
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these reasons, Peking may be much less reluctant to accept a regional
organization that would temper the American, Soviet and Japanese as well
as a Chinese penetration of Southeast Asia.

These are mere optimistic

speculations, concerning great power policies that may ensue,,
Hoxvever, it seems clear that an effective regional organization
requires the tolerance of the great powers and prefereably their co
operation.

This is not only true in the sense that major powers must

refrain from destroying the organization but also in the sense that
their positive support may well be indispensable during an organization's
birth as well as to its ultimate survival.

Indeed, it seems apparent

that the prospect of outside help for Southeast Asian enterprises, es
pecially economic, has been one of the incentives -to -regional-coopera-___
tion.

In view of the enormous needs of the region for future development,

this fact is likely to remain for several decades.

This may be one of

the effective tools available to outsiders to encourage and reinforce
the trend tovjard regional cooperation,.
Obviously, none of the major powers would tolerate the organiza
tion if it was considered to be the product of one of them.

Thus, all

outside support must be so organized that neither the non-aligned nor the
Asian character of the organization is endangered.

This condition could

be best fulfilled if the support is channeled through an international
agency rather than through any one member directly.

Agreement among

outsiders on this is paramount as the temptation of regional states will
be great to circumvent it.

Many of the -states in the area have already

been reported as welcoming an intensification of the power struggle in
the area on the ground that this enlarges their leeway for political •
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maneuvering.

With the entry of the Soviets, new opportunities of this

type develop.
If a regional organization exploits the presence of a great
power, no great harm appears manifest.

In contrast, if individual states

attempt to do so, the organization may be destined for an early demise
as the situation that initially made the organization necessary would
have been recreated.

A further improvement in the organization's results

might be achieved if the needed outside support would come from an
Asian or smaller Western nation.

As previously mentioned, Japan is

actively engaged in furthering the regional cooperation trend in Asia
and during the past few years has stimulated regional arrangements.

A

comprehensive regional organization would seem to be in accord with
Toayo’s. policies and under proper circumstances, Japan might play an
instrumental role.
William P. Bundy has set forth five "conditions for lasting
peace"1- in Southeast Asia, and they seem to culminate with the conclusion
of a non-aligned regional organization for the area.

These conditions

respond to the desires of Southeast Asians, while at the same time being
compatible xd.th the interests and interactions of the great powers.

First,

and foremost, the preservation of the independence of the individual
nations is paramount.
progress.

Second, a continued and improved rate of economic

Third, the fullest possible cooperation among the Southeast

. ^William P. Bundy, "New Tides in Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs.
(January, 1971), p. 192.

79
Asian nations.

Fourth, which Bundy refers to as a "common lav; of change"-^

simply means that the nations of an area are the initial judges of
whether change and the use of violence or force of any kind are or are
not fair and tolerable— and, thus, are or are not to be opposed or sup
ported by outside nations.
The fifth condition is the correct behavior of the great powers.
Optimistically, this should consist of a guarantee among interested
outside powers that they will not interfere by military or subversive
means in the area, and acting on the finding of the local jury, will
join together against an outside power or local nation that does.
is easier to say than do.

If a great-power make?

imposed law of behavior"^

and maintaining equilibrium.

This

Bundy feels a "selfThe former is

simply a code of conduct 'which bars great-power pressure and aggression
and subversion.

The latter is that no power should threaten to dominate.

The first three conditions appear to be at least in the developmental
stages but the last two are dependent on the actions of the great powers.
Thus, in broad outline, are the desirable directions for the future
development of international politics in Southeast Asia.

A regional

organization is far from an ideal solution but may have promise for
a durable peace, and further, it lies within the framework of past and
present policies conducted by the regional states as well as several
major powers.

Many of the states of the area are committed to such an

^Bundy, "New Tides in Southeast Asia," p. 193.
h b i d ., p. 194.
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organization and their inability to transform intentions into reality
may be overcome gradually by the pressures produced from the power
struggles of the great powers. Non-cooperation was a luxury that Southeast Asian nations could afford as long as Asia was a non-man’s land
for the external world*
However, the risks for each state of non-cooperation are rapidly
increasing.

Many of the leaders do not enjoy being a battle ground of

the major powers and a conviction is gaining among then that a position
outside the sphere of influence of any one of the major powers is a desireable goal for them all-and this includes North Vietnam, South Vietnam
or even a United Vietnam.

Similarly, the Soviet Union, United States,

-.and Japan would seem to share this position and-it is conceivable that- -.
China may be persuaded to accept it as well.

The most promising way to

reach this goal appears to be through the creation of a non-aligned
comprehensive organization in Southeast Asia«
"Whether or not a regional organization can develop fully in
Southeast Asia depends to a great extent on the actions of the nations
that are a part of the new quadrilateral balance emerging in the area.
The chances of achieving regional cooperation are real, and the strides
already taken are significant, but the great powers must allow Southeast
Asian hands to shape the Southeast Asian future.

The great-power role

must be one of a secondary nature in comparison to the nations of the
area.
Today a Southeast Asia, there appears to be a convergence of
factors that appear to be highly favorable to the United States.

Pre

cisely at a time, when Americans are most anxious to reduce their some-
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what unilateral role in Asian affairs, nations like Japan have begun to
achieve major economic output and nations like Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore have at least begun to espouse a
political outlook that makes the concept of burden-sharing applicable,.
If Southeast Asians can be encouraged and helped to assume more of the
burdens for their development and security, it is not unlikely that at
least a partial buffer will have been created between the United States
and China.
Circumstances are now appropriate for Southeast Asian peoples
to be encouraged to rely less upon American guarantees and more upon
themselves.

Also from the U.S. standpoint, it must be faced that the

power to effect'ba'sic change"In the" area“is' limited;“-In the -words of --David Mozingo,

’’The power fundamentally to change the basic indigenous

forces shaping the development and character of nationalism in Southeast
Asian countries lies neither in Peking nor Washington.Mozingo also
states:
The fear, expressed in the argument that neutralism or
nonalignment is simply a temporary way station on the
road to communisem, that Peking and other communists can
push over popular nationalist regimes like dominoes once
a Communist revolution succeeds somewhere else, is over
whelmingly contradicted by the proven vitality of Asian
nationalism in the last twenty years.116
If the major powers are truly limited by nationalism then this is simply

^David Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," World Politics.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (April, 1967), p. 377.

6Ibid., p. 373.
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an additional incentive, one for the shaping of the Asian future by
Asian hands*
Though this study has presented some quite optimistic speculations
concerning the actions of the great powers in the future structure
of Southeast Asia, these were mere "food for thought*"

For, in reality,

it seems clear that the future will rest on the two pillars: the col
lective interests of the Southeast Asian nations acting in regional
groupings, and the policies of the four powers who comprise the quadri
lateral balance*

The major elements of this structure seem clear*

How

ever, the relationship of them to each other is far from clear and will
depend largely upon decisions which are still to be made*
If the great powers utilize a less direct and more restrained

.

approach to the area so as to encourage and sustain regionalism, selfreliance and Asian initiatives, then the construction of a stable interna
tional order in the area may be forthcoming*

If the opposite conditions

ensue whereby great powers continue to play a direct meddling role, then
the most gross type of instability and lack of unity in the area will
likely prevail in conjunction with the veils of colonialism.

Active

regionalism is one of the new realities of Southeast Asia and one of
the more promising vehicles for the nations of the area to maintain their
independence, unity, economic growth and self-respect in the midst of
great power presence.

Obviously, whether or not this avenue is allowed

to flourish will be dependent to a degree on the great powers; they must
allow Asian hands to play the primary role in the shaping of the Asian
future.

The great powers can play an important secondary role, but it

must remain secondary and supporting.
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It would seem that the major powers whould all share several
basic interests in the area.

First, today because of the dangerous

imbalance between population and wealth, and because of the pressures
to achieve equality with the Northern nations, Southeast Asia is a some
what explosively unstable part of the world.

Though far away from the

United States, fires in Southeast Asia could lead to greater conflagra
tions.

Therefore, the great powers must attempt to bring the area closer

to prosperity, peace, and stability.
Second, the great powers appear to share in the future of the
area.

One day the nations of the area will be much more powerful than

they are today.

If this power is directed .toward non-cooperative ag

gressive behavior, then it could threaten world peace.

If it is oriented

toward cooperation and more peaceful undertakings, then it will be much
less of a threat.

The great powers have an important stake in the future

of the area— twenty or even fifty years from now.
Last, though it might sound somewhat unscholarly, it would seem
that there is a moral imperative to help those in need.

In a broader

context, it seems that it will be more and more difficult for the world
to continue half poor and half rich, half in turmoil and half at peace0
These nations which remain poor and impoverished will be a continuing
drain on the rest of the world.
will be a threat to all.

An unhappy, turbulent and war-torn area

The great powers should share the interest of

helping deprived areas become healthy parts of the world in which we live.
Thus, the great powers have important interests in the future of
the structure which is now emerging in Southeast Asia.

How they adjust

to that structure may determine the stability or instability of the
area for many decades.

The time has arrived-when we must now turn

our thoughts beyond the Vietnam quagmire and begin thinking more of the
future of the entire Southeast Asia area and to the two-pillared structure
which is emerging*
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